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ABSTRACT:  This  paper  describes  a  newly  extended  version  of  the  dynamic  micro  simulation  model 
SADNAP (Social Affairs Department of the Netherlands Ageing and Pensions model). SADNAP is being 
developed for calculating the financial and economic implications of the ageing of the population and of 
the  ageing-related  policy  measures  that  are  being  proposed  to  cope  with  ageing.  The  model  uses 
administrative datasets of Dutch public pension payments and entitlements for both public and private 
pensions. SADNAP has already been in use since 2007 for forecasting the state pension expenditures and 
for analysing the budgetary effects of policy changes.  
 
The model has been extended in order to give a broader assessment of policy alternatives by providing 
insight into other important evaluation indicators like income redistribution and the retirement decision of 
workers.  For  the  modelling  of  income  redistribution  a  new  micro  data  source  with  individual  data  on 
private pensions is combined with differentiation of mortality rates in order to gain a better insight in the 
income at the individual level within the population of pensioners. For the modelling of the retirement 
decision an option value model is developed in which key parameters vary at the individual level in order 
to benefit from the micro simulation approach. These extensions greatly enhance the performance of 
SADNAP. Besides the financial implications, additional insight can now be provided into the effects of 
policy measures on a set of key indicators.  
In  this  paper  both  extensions  are  described  in  detail  and  a  complete  baseline  projection  of  all  key 
indicators is discussed. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
The  Netherlands,  like  most  OECD-countries,  is 
facing  an  ageing  population.  Especially,  this  is  a 
complication for the state pension, known as AOW 
(Algemene  Ouderdoms  Wet),  which  is  financed 
through  a  pay-as-you-go  system.  The  state 
pension  is  the  first  pillar  in  the  Dutch  pension 
scheme,  which  is  based  on  three  pillars.  The 
second pillar consists of supplementary company 
or  occupational  pension  facilities.  Employees  are 
obliged to take part in those second-pillar pension 
programmes.  The  third  pillar  contains  individual 
pension saving programmes in which participation 
is  voluntarily.  Both  second  and  third-pillar 
pensions are fully funded.  
 
The  dynamic  micro  simulation  model  SADNAP 
(Social  Affairs  Department  of  the  Netherlands 
Ageing  and  Pensions  model)  is  being  developed 
for  calculating  the  financial  and  economic 
implications  of  the  ageing  problem  and  of  the 
policy  measures  considered.  A  micro  simulation 
model,  as  compared  to  macro-oriented  models, 
can give more detailed information on the ageing 
problem and on the redistributive effects of policy 
options,  which  can  be  used  in  the  evaluation  of 
those  options.  The  model  uses  administrative 
datasets  of  all  Dutch  public  pensions  and 
entitlements  for  all  public  pensions  and  a  large 
share of private pensions.  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 
gives  a  brief  overview  of  the  Dutch  pension 
system, the forecasting models currently in use at 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and 
a  short  general  introduction  to  micro  simulation 
models and the SADNAP model. Sections 3 and 4 
present  in  more  detail  two  recent  extensions  of 
the  SADNAP  model.  Section  3  focuses  on  the 
modelling of incomes and redistribution within the 
state  pension  system  and  in  section  4  the 
modelling  of  the  retirement  decision  using  the 
option  value  approach  is  described.  In  section  5 
the  main  results  of  the  model  are  presented. 
These results are limited to the baseline scenario 
of  unchanged  policies.  A  separate  paper  is 
dedicated  to  an  evaluation  of  different  policy 
options with the model. Section 6, finally, contains 
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2.  BACKGROUND 
2.1.  The Dutch pension system 
The  Dutch  government  supplies  a  state  pension 
called AOW to all persons aged 65 or over when 
they  become  entitled.  Inhabitants  of  the 
Netherlands  build  up  a  right  to  this  pension  by 
living in the Netherlands while aged between 15 
and 65. The state pension accrues at the rate of 
2% for every year this condition is fulfilled. Part of 
the  population  is  only  partially  entitled  because 
they  have  not  lived  in  the  Netherlands 
continuously between the ages of 15 and 65. This 
share  of  incomplete  state  pensions  is  rising 
because  of  the  growing  number  of  immigrants 
during the last few decades. 
The  state  pension  scheme  provides  a  basic 
minimum  income  guarantee  in  case  of  a  full 
entitlement.  Therefore  the  system  makes  a 
distinction between partners of a couple and single 
persons. A single person is entitled to 70% of the 
net minimum wage
1 and a member of a couple is 
entitled to 50% of the net minimum wage. Until 
2015,  persons  with  a  (non-working)  partner 
younger  than  65  can  supplement  their  state 
pension of 50% with an allowance of another 50% 
to a combined maximum of 100% of the minimum 
wage.  Partially  entitled  persons  can  claim  social 
assistance. Social assistance, however, is income 
and means tested.  
 
The  AOW  is  a  pay-as-you-go  arrangement,  the 
current population of workers pay for the current 
population  of  pensioners.  Hence  the  AOW  is 
financed  through  a  premium  paid  by  these 
workers. The premium is fixed at a rate of 17.9% 
of the first two tax brackets (the limiting income is 
approximately  €  32,000 in  2009).  Revenue  from 
this  premium  is  not  sufficient  to  cover  all  AOW 
costs,  however.  The  government  contributes  the 
part of the AOW costs (currently about one third) 
that  is  not  covered  by  the  premiums.  The 
government  contribution  is  financed  by  taxes, 
which are paid by pensioners as well.  
 
The importance of second and third-pillar pensions 
for the income position of the elderly is growing as 
more  people  are  saving  for  such  pensions  and 
their  average  savings  are  increasing.  Per  person 
average second-pillar pension savings are almost 
equal now to the average first pillar state pension 
savings.  In  the  future,  it  is  to  be  expected  that 
second  and  third-pillar  pensions  together  will 
provide  more  than  half  of  the  average  pension 
income.  Although  there  are  many  second-pillar 
pension  funds  in  the  Netherlands,  each  with  its 
own rules on contributions and pensions, broadly 
speaking  one  can  say  that  pension  funds  try  to 
                                                 
1   The gross minimum wage in 2009 amounts to 
approximately  €  18,000  per  year.  The  gross 
AOW-benefit  for  a  single  person  is 
approximately  €  12,700,  the  gross  AOW-
benefit  for  a  couple  is  approximately  €  8,700 
for each partner. In net terms this amounts to 
70%  and  50%  of  the  net  minimum  wage 
respectively. 
supplement  the  state  pension  to  a  total  gross 
income level of 70% of the pensioner’s final wage. 
Most pension funds have recently switched from a 
final wage system to a career average system, but 
on average they still aim for a gross pension level 
of 70% of the final wage. Because pensioners no 
longer  have  to  pay  state  pension  contributions, 
the  net  height  of  their  first  and  second-pillar 
pensions  together  usually,  in  the  case  of  a  full 
pension,  comes  close  to  90%  of  the  final  wage. 
Other  income  sources,  like  third-pillar  pensions 
can add to this income level. 
2.2.  Models currently in use 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment is 
responsible  for  preparing  state  pension  forecasts 
for  the  yearly  budget.  The  budget  horizon  is  six 
years  (the  current  budget  for  2010  contains 
forecasts from 2009 until 2014). Although beyond 
the  budget  horizon,  the  long-term  forecast  of 
pension  expenses  is  of  great  importance  as  well 
because government budgets are also affected by 
the  long-term  sustainability  of  public  finance. 
Besides  the  financial  effects  for  the  government 
budget,  the  Minister  of  Social  Affairs  and 
Employment is also responsible for income policies 
and labour participation policies. When new policy 
options  are  discussed,  a  broad  analysis  of  both 
short-term and long-term financial effects, income 
effects  and  labour  participation  effects  will  be 
required. Moreover, in the case of ageing-related 
policy measures, income effects will not be limited 
to  direct  effects  on  purchasing  power  but  will 
include  intra-generational  and  inter-generational 
redistribution issues as well. In order to assess all 
these  effects,  a  number  of  different  models  are 
used.  
 
For state pension expenses, a simple macro model 
is  used,  using  forecasts  of  the  number  of 
pensioners for the most relevant subgroups of the 
state  pension  population  (men  and  women, 
singles  and  couples  with  and  without  a  partner 
allowance,  complete  and  reduced  pensions). 
These volume forecasts are supplied by the state 
pension  administration  office  (SVB).  The  macro 
model  calculates  the  costs  by  multiplying  the 
expected  group  sizes  with  the  average  pensions 
for  each  group.  As  the  SVB  forecasts  project 
ahead  as  far  as  2024  and  rely  heavily  on 
extrapolating  existing  trends,  for  the  long-term 
development  of  the  state  pension  expenses,  the 
Ministry relies on a macro AGE model of CPB. This 
model, called GAMMA (see Van Ewijk et al., 2006), 
is used once every four years (in the run-up to the 
general elections) for a long-term forecast of the 
whole  Dutch  economy.  For  income  effects,  the 
long running static micro simulation model Micros 
(Hendrix,  1993)  has  been  used  since  the  early 
1990s.  This  model  focuses  on  the  short-term 
income effects of complex sets of policy measures. 
Labour  participation  effects  are  quantified  on  an 
ad-hoc basis using recent research papers by CPB 
and  others.  Redistribution  effects  are  mostly 
abstracted from or quantified on an ad-hoc basis 
as well. 
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This approach has several shortcomings. Because 
different  models  from  different  internal  and 
external  sources  are  used,  it  is  very  difficult  to 
obtain a consistent picture of the effects of policy 
measures.  Besides,  the  Ministry  is  highly 
dependent  on  other  institutions  for  supplying 
information  and  forecasts.  Therefore,  it  can  be 
difficult to anticipate and respond quickly to policy 
developments.  Also,  the  quality  and  richness  in 
detail of the forecasts can be improved by using 
one consistent micro simulation model.  
 
In  the  first  place,  information  does  get  lost 
because  the  macro  model  uses  only  a  small 
number  of  groups  sharing  the  same  basic 
characteristics.  Age  groups  are  not  included,  for 
example,  although  among  the  population  of 
persons  aged  65  and  over,  different  ages  may 
have very different characteristics. Second, there 
are  certain  features  of  the  AOW  that  cannot 
simply be taken into account with macro models, 
such  as  changes  in  migration  patterns  and 
changes  in  household  situation.  Migration  affects 
the  entitlements  to  the  AOW  because  the  AOW-
entitlement  depends  on  citizenship.  Changes  in 
the number and age of immigrants and emigrants 
will  affect  the  pension  expenses  later  on.  The 
AOW-entitlement  also  depends  on  household 
situation.  Two  single  persons  receive  a  higher 
pension than two persons in a couple, so when the 
number  of  singles  among  the  population  of 
pensioners rises, the cost of the AOW will rise as 
well. Third, the macro models are limited to the 
state  pensions,  that  provide  the  basic  income 
level, whereas the main differences in the income 
positions  of  pensioners  are  caused  by  private 
pensions. The Micros model, which is used for the 
income  effects,  is  a  static  model  that  is  not 
capable of adequate long-term forecasts. Fourth, 
the  effects  on  labour  participation  and  income 
redistribution  are  not  captured  at  all  by  the 
current models in use at the Ministry. 
 
Therefore  the  Ministry  has  been  developing  the 
dynamic  micro  simulation  model  SADNAP  to 
handle  the  problems  just  mentioned.  SADNAP  is 
an integral ageing and pensions model, including 
the  income  and  redistributive  effects  of  different 
policy  measures.  The  purpose  of  SADNAP  is  to 
provide  consistent  and  integral  forecasts  of  both 
short-term  and  long-term  effects  of  the  baseline 
scenario of unchanged policies and various policy 
measures  on  the  cost  of  state  pensions  for 
government  budget,  the  income  position  of  the 
elderly,  redistribution  and  labour  participation. 
SADNAP  has  already  been  used  for  budgetary 
forecasts since 2007. 
2.3.  Micro simulation models 
Micro simulation basically is a modelling technique 
that  uses  large  datasets  containing  data  on  the 
individual  level.  Records  on  individual  persons 
contain  characteristics  like  birth  year,  gender, 
ethnicity,  income  level,  household  status  etc. 
Transition probabilities and institutional rules are 
applied to simulate whether events will happen in 
the  future  to  a  specific  record,  e.g.  whether 
someone starts working or finishes a relationship. 
Calculation  rules  are  used  to  apply  the 
probabilities  and  institutional  rules  to  the  micro 
data  file.  The  result  is  an  estimate  of  the 
outcomes  of  applying these  rules,  including  both 
the total aggregate change and the distributional 
nature of that change. 
 
Micro  simulation  models  can  be  subdivided  in 
many  different  ways  (O’Donoghue,  2001).  The 
most important one is between dynamic and static 
models.  With  dynamic  micro  simulation  the 
characteristics of a record can change over time. 
Static  micro  simulation  does  not  allow 
characteristics  to  change.  Although  in  static 
simulations reweighing techniques can be used to 
allow for changes in population composition, static 
micro simulation is usually seen as more suited for 
short-term forecasts, like the short-term impact of 
fiscal  measures,  whereas  dynamic  micro 
simulation  is  seen  as  more  suited  for  long-term 
forecasts like the impact of ageing.  
 
Micro  simulation  is  subject  to  Monte  Carlo 
variability, resulting in different outcomes for each 
individual  simulation  experiment.  Of  course,  a 
larger sample can reduce the fluctuations between 
different  runs  with  the  model,  but  not  eliminate 
them.  Moreover,  in  large  dynamic  micro 
simulations sample size can still be limited due to 
disk  capacity  or  computer  speed.  One  can  deal 
with  the  Monte  Carlo  variability  in  several  ways. 
First,  several  simulations  can  be  done  and  an 
average outcome can be calculated. The difference 
in  average  outcome  between  the  base  situation 
and the policy alternative can then be accounted 
to  the  policy  change.  A  second  approach  is 
proposed by Klevmarken (2007), who describes a 
calibration  technique  in  which  the  simulation 
results  are  aligned  to  an  a  priori  defined  target, 
such  as  a  macro  forecast,  eliminating  the 
variability.  Third,  Monte  Carlo  variance  can  be 
avoided completely by using a fixed set of random 
numbers  used  to  generate  the  events.  This  last 
method is useful to allow for replication of model 
results and to compare policy alternatives to the 
base  situation,  because  when  the  random 
numbers  are  fixed,  differences  between  two 
simulations  can  only  be  caused  by  the  policy 
change.  For  every  individual  a  simulation  of  a 
policy  alternative  can  then  be  performed  under 
exactly the same conditions as the simulation of 
the baseline scenario. In SADNAP, both calibration 
and fixing of random numbers are used. 
 
Micro  simulation  is  very useful  when  information 
for specific individuals or groups of individuals is 
needed.  Information  on  specific  groups  can  also 
be obtained by creating more groups within cell-
based  macro  forecasts.  In  practice,  however, 
because  of  the  large  number  of  subgroups  that 
arise  when  taking  into  account  all  the  relevant 
characteristics,  these  cell-based  approaches 
become  problematic  when  the  subgroup  size 
becomes  too  small  (Van  Sonsbeek  and  Gradus, 
2006). 
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However,  construction  of  a  dynamic  micro 
simulation  model  can  be  very  complex  and  time 
consuming.  This  holds  true  especially  for  a 
dynamic  population  model,  which  requires 
replacing the starting population with new cohorts 
over  time.  Cassels,  Harding  and  Kelly  (2006) 
identify  some  success  and  failure  factors  and 
recommend  that  models  should  have  clear 
objectives,  a  modular  design,  be  user  friendly, 
produce  timely  output  and  be  transparent.  With 
SADNAP  these  recommendations  have  been 
followed  by  initially  limiting  the  model  to  the 
budgetary impact of the state pensions only. 
2.4.  The SADNAP model 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment has 
been  developing  the  SADNAP  model  since  2006. 
As the model is modularly designed, attention was 
first  focused  on  the  demographic  model  and  the 
state pension forecast. Therefore, since 2007 the 
SADNAP  output  has  been  used  in  preparing  the 
state pension budget forecasts of the Ministry. An 
early project description is documented in Van der 
Werf, Van Sonsbeek and Gradus (2007). In later 
years,  the  original  demographic  modules  have 
been  extended.  The  immigration  and  emigration 
code has been improved in order to allow for the 
interdependency  between  the  two  (immigrants 
having a higher emigration rate). Also, the take-
up  of  state  pensions  by  former  emigrants  has 
been  incorporated  in  the  model.  The  household 
formation  code  has  been  improved  in  order  to 
provide reliable relationship patterns at the micro 
level.  In  a  new  module,  non-budgetary  aspects 
(like  income  distribution  and  labour 
participation/retirement  decision)  have  been 
introduced  in  order  to  gain  a  more  complete 
picture of the pros and cons of different ageing-
related policy measures. 
 
In the early  versions, the income was limited to 
the state pension (building up of entitlements for 
the  population  aged  64  and  below  and  pension 
payments for the population aged 65 and over). 
The income position has now been supplemented 
with  private  pension  data,  first  with  rough 
estimates  based  on  aggregate  data  and 
subsequently with a full micro data set on private 
pension entitlements which has been supplied by 
Statistics  Netherlands.  A  detailed  description  of 
the demographic and income modules of SADNAP 
is given in appendix A and a detailed description 
of  the  micro  and  macro  data  sources  used  in 
SADNAP  is  supplied  in  appendix  B.  The  flow 
diagram of the SADNAP model is given in figure 1. 
 
This  paper  focuses  on  two  extensions  of  the 
SADNAP  model  which  have  been  implemented 
recently. The first is the differentiation of mortality 
rates that is used to investigate the redistribution 
within  the  state  pension  scheme,  and  which  is 
described  in  section  3.  The  second  is  the 
modelling  of  labour  participation  and  the 
retirement decision, which is described in section 
4. Both extensions fill the gaps that were left in 
the assessment of policy alternatives as described 
in section 2.2. 
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Figure 1  SADNAP model flow diagram  
 
 
2.5.  Comparison  with  other  dynamic 
population micro simulation models 
Within  the  Netherlands,  SADNAP  is  the  second 
attempt  to  develop  a  dynamic  population  micro 
simulation  model  capturing  ageing  issues.  The 
only comparable model in the Netherlands is the 
NEDYMAS  model  (Nelissen,  1993),  which  was 
prominent during the 1990s. Although SADNAP, as 
compared  to  some  well-known  international 
simulation models, is a comparatively simple and 
small-scale  project,  it  shares  some  key 
characteristics with these larger models. Cassels, 
Harding and Kelly (2006) present an overview of 
six  large  dynamic  population  micro  simulation 
models  (Dynasim3  from  the  USA,  Dynacan  from 
Canada,  Mosart  from  Norway,  Sesim  from 
Sweden,  Sage  from  the  UK  and  Dynamod  from 
Australia).  Like  all  the  models  but  Dynamod, 
SADNAP  is  a  discrete  model  with  one  year  time 
steps.  The  development  platform  is  SAS,  as  in 
Dynasim3. The sample size (1-2%) is comparable 
to  most  models  (e.g.  Dynacan,  Mosart, 
Dynamod).  The  time  horizon  (2080)  is  also 
comparable to for example, Dynacan and Mosart 
(2100). In SADNAP results are aligned to targets 
taken from macro data sources. As in, Dynacan, 
for  example,  alignment  targets  include  rates  for 
mortality,  fertility,  migration,  marriage  and 
divorce  propensities.  As  in  most  of  the  models 
mentioned,  SADNAP  contains  modules  on 
population,  household  formation,  labour  force 
participation, benefits and taxation. 
 
However,  there  are  some  simplifications  as 
compared  to  the  larger  models.  For  example, 
household formation in SADNAP is a binary choice 
between single and cohabiting, which excludes, for 
example, children leaving home, people moving in 
and  out  institutions  and  adults  living  in  other 
households  without  family  relations  (cf.  Mosart). 
Taxation is included in SADNAP as in most other 
models (except Dynacan) but is simplified to the 
main  tariff  structure.  Education  and  health  are 
abstracted  from  SADNAP.  Financial  wealth  and 
savings are also abstracted, but they are planned 
for  an  extension  in  the  future.  SADNAP  is 
comparatively  narrow  in  scope,  like  for  example 
Dynacan,  so  most  effort  is  put  into  subjects 
directly  related  to  pensions  and  ageing.  In  the 
current SADNAP version, most effort has been put 
into  the  retirement  decision  model,  which 
consequently is comparatively elaborate.
 VAN SONSBEEK      Micro simulations on the effects of ageing-related policy measures: The Social Affairs Department of 
the Netherlands Ageing and Pensions Model 
  77 
3.  MODELLING  REDISTRIBUTION  WITHIN 
THE STATE PENSION SYSTEM 
The Dutch state pension scheme can be classified 
as a “Beveridge”-style public pension programme 
(Disney,  2004),  characterized  by  significant 
departures from actuarial fairness and significant 
provision  of  private  retirement  benefits,  as 
opposed  to  “Bismarck”-style  public  pension 
programmes,  characterized  by  high  actuarial 
fairness  and  limited  private  provision  of  private 
retirement  benefits.  The  Dutch  scheme,  with  its 
flat-rate  pensions  for  single  persons  and 
cohabitants,  therefore  has  a  highly  intra-
generational redistributive character.  
There  is  also  redistribution  from  higher  to  lower 
incomes because higher income earners contribute 
more  to  the  scheme  during  their  lifetime. 
However,  this  only  holds  true  for  income 
differences  up  to  the  limiting  income  of 
approximately  €  32,000  (in  2009).  For  the 
moment,  this  kind  of  intergenerational 
redistribution is not included. Additional research 
has to be done in order to identify which groups 
have a better balance of withdrawals as compared 
to their contributions.  
 
Typically,  subgroups  with  lower  life  expectancies 
on  average  contribute  more  than  they  withdraw 
from the scheme. Well known factors affecting life 
expectancy  are  gender,  income,  marital  status 
and ethnic background. Gender- and age-specific 
mortality  rates  are  derived  from  the  CBS 
population  forecast  and  were  used  in  SADNAP 
from  the  beginning.  However,  there  are  also 
notable  differences  in  mortality  rates  between 
different  income  levels,  between  single  persons 
and  couples  and  between  different  ethnicities. 
From a redistribution perspective those differences 
are  important  although  they  are  not  easy  to 
implement  in  a  simulation  model  because  of 
alignment  problems.  Moreover,  these  possible 
causes correlate, complicating the analysis of the 
ground cause of the differences in mortality.  
 
On  the  relationship  between  income  and  life 
expectancy,  in  a  large  Finnish  study  Martikainen 
et  al.  (2001)  show  the  mortality  rates  of  the 
lowest income decile on average to be 2.37 times 
as  high  for  men  over  30  years  of  age  and  1.73 
times as high for women over 30 years of age as 
those  in  the  highest  income  decile.  On  the 
relationship  between  marital  status  and  life 
expectancy,  de  Jong  (2002)  shows  the  mortality 
rates  of  married  people  to  be  significantly  lower 
than those of single, divorced or widowed persons. 
The difference is larger for men than for women, 
and increases in time for both men and women. 
However,  the  differences  in  mortality  rates  are 
smaller  in  the  higher  age  categories.  On  the 
relationship  between  ethnic  background  and  life 
expectancy, Bos et al. (2004) show mortality to be 
higher among three of the four largest groups of 
immigrant  males  in  the  Netherlands.  However, 
among Moroccan males, mortality appeared to be 
lower and among females in general, inequalities 
in mortality were small. Moreover, mortality rates 
were  influenced  by  marital  status  and  socio-
economic  status,  leaving  a  smaller  influence  of 
ethnic  background  in  itself,  except  for  younger 
age categories. This contrasts with data from SVB 
(2008)  showing  the  mortality  age  of  people  not 
born in the Netherlands, to be significantly lower 
than that of people born in the Netherlands, with 
differences in average mortality age of more than 
10  years  between  natives  and  Turks  and 
Moroccans. On average, people with reduced state 
pensions,  including  most  first  generation 
immigrants, live four years less than people with 
full state pensions, according to this study. 
 
In SADNAP, the differences in mortality rates by 
income are derived from the study of Martikainen 
et al. (2001). The expected total private pension 
is  used  as  a  proxy  for  income.  This  means  that 
people do not move between income deciles, only 
one “lifetime” decile is assigned per person. The 
estimation  of  the  pension  entitlements  has  been 
improved  recently  because  a  detailed  micro 
dataset  of  company  pensions  has  become 
available. This dataset is described in appendix B. 
The wage level of the participants is known for the 
base  year.  Their  pension  entitlements  are  based 
on  continuation  of  their  current  wage  level 
throughout  their  working  life.  That  means  that, 
the  younger  one  is  in  the  base  year,  the  less 
accurate  the  pension  entitlement  forecast  is  as 
wages are expected to rise during the working life. 
Wages in the Netherlands are strongly correlated 
with  age.  Figure  2  presents  the  average  wages 
and expected pensions by age based on the 2005 
micro  dataset.  The  picture  strongly  resembles 
earlier findings on age-earnings profiles like those 
from a longitudinal Dutch survey (Alessie, Lusardi 
and  Aldershof  (1997)  and  more  recently  Kalmijn 
and  Alessie  (2008)).  They  found  that  the  age-
earnings  profile  shows  a  steep  profile  for  the 
young, subsequently a moderate increase over the 
life  cycle  and  finally  a  sharp  decline  well  before 
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Currently  SADNAP  lacks  the  more  elaborate 
modelling  of  wages  over  the  life  cycle  of,  for 
example,  Borella  and  Coda  Moscarola  (2005). 
However,  when  wages  and  pension  savings  are 
assumed to follow each other’s development over 
the  life  cycle,  the  replacement  rates  will  remain 
the same. Only, as earlier noted, the replacement 
rates  for  the  youngest  age  cohorts  provide  no 
good guidance for the replacement rates at older 
ages.  Figure  2  suggests  that  from  age  30-35 
onwards reasonably accurate projections of future 
income development can be made. 
 
By introducing this difference in mortality rates by 
income,  differences  in  mortality  rates  by 
household status and ethnic group are introduced 
at  the  same  time,  as  single  persons  on  average 
have  lower  incomes  than  cohabitants  and 
immigrants on average have lower incomes than 
natives.  This  also  results  in  higher  mortality 
among people with reduced state pensions, mainly 
immigrants,  an  observation  that  also  is  made  in 
SVB (2008). A further difference in mortality rates 
between  single  persons  and  cohabitants  and 
between natives and immigrants is introduced in 
order to increase the differences in life expectancy 
to  the  levels  reported  in  the  studies  of  de  Jong 
and Bos et al. respectively. 
 
Table 1 shows the life expectancies (at age 65) for 
different  subgroups  of  the  population  of 
pensioners  for  the  2006-2045  cohorts  of 
pensioners (the 1941-1980 birth cohorts). As the 
simulation  runs  until  2080,  the  2045  pensioner 
cohort  is  one  of  the  last  cohorts  that  will  have 
almost completely died out by 2080. Besides the 
familiar difference in life expectancy between men 
and  women,  there  are  also  sizeable  differences 
between  different  income  groups,  between 
cohabitants  and  single  persons  and  between 
natives and non-natives. The differences between 
income  groups  are  in  line  with  recent  Dutch 
research by Kalwij, Alessie and Knoef (2009). The 
average expected age of the cohorts turning 65 is 
86. This is consistent with CBS (2009) in which life 
expectancy at 65 years old rises from 19.4 years 
(17.8  for  men  and  21.0  for  women)  in  2009  to 
21.8 years (20.8 for men and 22.9 for women) in 
2045.  The  difference  in  life  expectancy  between 
men  and  women  is  decreasing  over  time  until  a 
difference  of  about  two  years  is  left.  The 
differences  in  life  expectancy  between  income 
quintiles,  single  persons  and  cohabitants  and 
natives  and  first  generation  immigrants  are 
assumed to remain constant over time. 
 
The population decomposition used allows for an 
analysis of redistribution within the state pension 
scheme  by  aggregating  pension  payments  for 
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Table  1    Average  life  expectancies  at  65 of  the 
2006-2045 pensioner cohorts  
 
Subgroup  Average 
mortality age 
Δ Average 
By income     
-  1
st quintile  83.5  -2.5 
-  2
nd quintile  84.5  -1.5 
-  3
rd quintile  85.6  -0.4 
-  4
th quintile  86.8  +0.8 
-  5
th quintile  88.5  +2.5 
By gender     
-  Women  86.9  +0.9 
-  Men  85.1  -0.9 
By household status     
-  Singles  84.4  -1.6 
-  Cohabitants  86.7  +0.7 
By origin     
-  Natives  86.6  +0.6 
-  Immigrants  84.0  -2.0 
Total  86.0   
4.  MODELLING THE RETIREMENT DECISION 
OF EMPLOYEES 
In most current literature the retirement decision 
is  modelled  by  using  the  option  value  model  by 
Stock and Wise (1990). More and more often, this 
approach  is  implemented  in  micro  simulation 
models (e.g. Dekkers, 2007). In the option value 
model,  the  individual  chooses  the  optimal 
retirement  age  R*  by  maximizing  the  expected 
lifetime  utility  from  both  consumption  (labour 
income)  and  leisure  (retirement  income).  In  this 
decision  the  expected  value  of  all  current  and 
future  incomes  Vt(R)  at  all  possible  retirement 
ages t is considered. 
 












Here  β  (=1/1+ρ)  represents  the  discount  factor 
(with ρ the time preference parameter), p(s|t) the 
survival probability, Uy the utility of consumption, 
Ys  the  labour  income,  γ  the  risk-aversion 
parameter, Ub the utility of leisure, k the leisure 
preference parameter and Bs(R) the income after 
retirement.  Often,  the  option  value  model  is 
simplified  (Euwals,  Van  Vuuren  and  Wolthoff, 
2006) by fixing the parameters γ, k and ρ at some 
given  values,  but  in  a  micro  simulation  model, 
heterogeneity  in  the  parameters  can  be 
implemented  straightforwardly.  Also  the  peak 
value  model  as  proposed  by  Coile  and  Gruber 
(1998) and discussed by Samwick (2001) can be 
considered  a  simplification  of  the  option  value 
model.  In  the  peak  value  model  future  earnings 
no  longer  play  a  role  in  the  retirement  decision. 
This  approach  chooses  the  retirement  age  that 
maximizes  the  expected  lifetime  retirement 
income.  Abstracting  from  future  earnings  allows 
us to set the leisure preference parameter k to 1, 
which  as  Samwick  (2001)  notes,  seems 
counterintuitive  but  as  peak  value  compares 
income  flows  only  during  retirement,  this 
assumption  is  not  restrictive.  The  values  of  the 
option  value  parameters  vary  widely  in  the 
literature and differ from the original estimates of 
Stock  and  Wise  (γ  =  0.63,  k  =  1.25  and  ρ  = 
0.28). Euwals, van Vuuren and Wolthoff propose 
parameter values for the Netherlands of γ = 0.75, 
k = 1.7 and ρ = 0.04. 
 
In SADNAP, assuming 60 to be the first and 70 to 
be  the  last  possible  retirement  age,  for  each 
individual  the  option  value  is  computed  for 
retirement ages 60 to 69. The utility functions Uy 
and  Ub  equal  labour  and  retirement  income 
respectively. The model then depends on generic 
gender-specific  survival  rates  and  the  discount 
rate, leisure preference value, risk-aversion value, 
labour income and retirement income that are all 
specific to the individual. The expected retirement 
age  is  set  to  the  year  (t)  that  maximizes  the 
option  value.  In  this  retirement  decision  the 
expected value of all current and future incomes 
Vt(R) is taken into account.  
 
In the option value model, the role of the discount 
rate  is  important.  In  the  original  estimates  of 
Stock  and  Wise,  based  on  utility  rather  than 
income,  a  very  high  discount  rate  of  0.28 
(corresponding to a discount factor of 0.78) was 
estimated.  In  most  later  research  (e.g.  Börsch-
Supan,  2000,  and  Berkel  and  Börsch-Supan, 
2003) much lower discount rates of 0.03 to 0.05 
were  used.  In  general,  in  the  literature  the 
estimates of the time preference parameter vary 
within a wide range, as is shown in an overview 
by  Frederick,  Loewenstein  and  O’Donoghue 
(2002).  This  suggests  heterogeneity.  Samwick 
(1998)  notes  that  a  distribution  of  preference 
parameters  like  the  discount  rate  should  be 
assumed instead of a fixed value. Samwick finds a 
median value of the discount rate of 0.08 for all 
ages  (slightly  lower  for  the  60-65  years  age 
group).  He  finds  a  distribution  with  50%  of 
discount rates between 0.03 and 0.15 but also a 
large  number  of  outliers  with  about  5%  having 
negative  discount  rates  of  -0.15  and  below  and 
20% having discount rates of 0.2 and above. Also 
Gustman  and  Steinmeier  (2005)  estimate  a 
distribution of time preference with 40% between 
0  and  0.05,  20%  between  0.05  and  0.1  and  a 
large group of over 25% having a very high time 
preference  rate  of  over  0.5.  In  SADNAP  the 
findings  from  both  studies  are  combined,  taking 
advantage  of  the  micro  simulation  approach  by 
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having  a  discount  rate  of  0,  20%  uniformly 
distributed  between  0  and  0.05,  20%  uniformly 
distributed between 0.05 and 0.1, 20% uniformly 
distributed  between  0.1  and  0.2  and  20% 
uniformly distributed between 0.2 and 1. 
 
The estimates of the leisure valuation parameter 
or rate of substitution between consumption and 
leisure also vary widely. Stock and Wise estimate 
the parameter k at 1.25 whereas Börsch-Supan et 
al. (2004) estimate k at 2.8. This may of course 
represent  a  difference  in  the  leisure  valuation 
between  the  USA  and  continental  Europe. 
However, most other studies, like Bovenberg and 
Knaap (2005) who find an elasticity of substitution 
of 0.56 corresponding to a k-value of 1.78, report 
values in between. On the difference between men 
and women, Lise and Seitz (2007) report only a 
minor difference: they estimate k for men at 1.58 
and for women at 1.64. In the simulation model, 
the average is assumed to be 2.0 and a uniform 
distribution of leisure valuation rates between 1.0 
and  3.0  is  applied  for  both  men  and  women. 
Correlation  between  time  preference  and  leisure 
preference  was  hypothesized  and  rejected  by 
Gustman and Steinmeier (2005). 
 
The estimates of the risk-aversion parameter vary 
less.  In  general,  people  are  risk-averse  in  their 
pension  and  retirement  decisions.  In  the  option 
value  model,  the  lower  the  risk-aversion 
parameter γ is, the earlier the retirement age will 
be. Stock and Wise estimate the parameter γ at 
0.63.  Euwals,  van  Vuuren  and  Wolthoff  propose 
0.75. In a recent study, based on Austrian data, 
Manoli, Mullen and Wagner (2009) estimate γ at 
0.71 with a 95% confidence interval between 0.49 
and 0.81. In the simulation model, we assume γ 
to  have  an  average  of  0.7  and  an  uniform 
distribution between 0.5 and 0.9.  
 
The future retirement incomes (both state pension 
and second-pillar pension) are easy to predict at 
age 60, as most entitlements have been built up 
and  mainly  depend  on  institutional  parameters. 
However,  the  future  labour  income  is  more 
difficult to predict. A simple approach would be to 
set the labour income for ages 61-70 equal to the 
labour income at age 60. For the higher ages this 
may  not  be  a  good  approach  because  of  the 
decrease in  productivity that  can  be  expected in 
combination with rising probabilities of becoming 
disabled or unemployed, which the individual will 
take  into  account  in  his  decision.  Therefore  we 
specify  the  formula  for  labour  income  in  year 
(t+1) as a function of labour income in year (t), 
the  expected  yearly  wage  decrease  τ  due  to 
productivity loss and the probability of becoming 
disabled p(d|t) or unemployed p(u|t) during year 
t.  We  assume  that  both  unemployment  and 
disability lead to an income loss of 30% as both 
disability  and  unemployment  benefits  roughly 
equal 70% of the former wage
2. 
                                                 
2   With  some  exceptions:  benefits  for  the 
permanently,  fully  disabled  equal  75%  of  the 
former  wage.  Unemployment  benefits  equal 
 
(2) ￿Y￿"￿￿ ￿ ￿1 $ τ￿&￿1 $ p￿d|t￿ $
p￿u|t￿￿Y￿ ￿ ￿p￿d|t￿ ￿ p￿u|t￿￿0.7Y￿+ 
For an indication of a plausible value for τ we can 
have a closer look at the age-earnings profile of 
elderly  workers.  Figure  2  represents  all  wages 
including  those  of  the  self-employed  and  of 
retirees working part-time and table 8 represents 
the wages of the employees only. From figure 2, it 
appears that the average wage at age 64 is 38% 
lower  than  at  age  59,  which  corresponds  to  a 
value of τ of 0.09. From table 8, it appears that 
the 60-64 years olds earn almost the same as the 
55-59 years olds, which corresponds to a value of 
τ  of  zero.  The  latter  intuitively  corresponds  to  a 
society in which demotion is almost non-existent. 
The  wage  decrease  from  figure  8  reflects  both 
overrepresentation  of  self-employed,  who  work 
longer but earn less, and employees working less 
hours, either by preference or due to their health. 
It can be concluded that people who work on until 
65 will have no loss of income, but that when also 
the employees who by preference or due to their 
health work less than 20 hours a week (who are 
considered  retired)  are  taken  into  account,  an 
income loss exists. We tested average values of τ 
of  0  and  0.045  and  concluded  that  in  the  τ=0 
scenario the share of the population working until 
the  last  possible  retirement  age  (of  70)  was 
unrealistically  high,  as  compared  to  Euwals  and 
Folmer (2009). In the τ=0.045 scenario, a close 
match with Euwals and Folmer (2009) was made 
for  males  (10%  of  the  65-70  years  old 
participating on average). Therefore we assume τ 
to  have  an  average  of  0.045  and  a  uniform 
distribution between 0 and 0.09. 
 
In the present version of SADNAP the option value 
approach is used for the retirement decision of the 
birth  cohorts  from  1946  until  1970.  The  1946 
cohort is aged 60 in 2006, the starting year of the 
simulation.  The  1970  cohort  is  aged  35  in  2006 
and above it was noted that wages and pensions 
were known with enough accuracy from about the 
age  of  35  onwards.  The  option  value  approach 
computes an expected retirement age based on a 
forward-looking calculation. In reality, events like 
unemployment  and  disability  will  influence  the 
retirement  decision.  Therefore,  after  determining 
the  optimal  retirement  age  at  60,  all  individuals 
work  through  until  the  optimal  retirement  age 
unless  they  become  unemployed  or  disabled.  As 
both  unemployment  and  disability  can  be 
considered  absorbing  states  from  age  60 
                                                                             
75%  of  the  former  wage  during  the  first  two 
months  of  unemployment  and  70%  for  the 
three years thereafter. After those three years 
and  two  months,  all  people  who  become 
unemployed from age 60 onwards can claim a 
minimum  benefit  to  bridge  the  gap  until 
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onwards
3, in that case the year that one becomes 
unemployed  or  disabled  is  considered  to  be  the 
year  of  retirement.  Unemployment  and  disability 
probabilities are observed in 2008 for the ages 60 
through  to  64.  Unemployment  and  disability 
probabilities for age 65 onwards are considered to 
be  equal  to  those  observed  at  64.  Whereas 
disability  probabilities,  even  at  higher  ages,  are 
currently quite low because of the 2006 disability 
reform  (see  Van  Sonsbeek  and  Gradus,  2006), 
unemployment  probabilities  rise  up  to  5%  per 
year for 64 years olds in 2008, and that year was 
still barely affected by the economic crisis. Table 2 
summarizes the option value parameters used in 
SADNAP. 
Table 2  Option value parameters  
Parameter  Mean 
value 
Distribution 
-  k (leisure 
preference) 
2.0  U (1 , 3) 
-  ρ (time preference)  0.17  0 
U(0 , 0.05) 
U(0.05 , 0.1) 
U(0.1 , 0.2) 
U(0.2 , 1.0) 
-  γ (risk aversion)  0.7  U(0.5 , 0.9) 
-  τ (expected wage 
decrease after age 
60) 
0.045  U(0 , 0.09) 
 
Furthermore,  mortality  before  age  70  is 
considered to be related to ill health at age 65, so 
individuals who die before the age of 70 will not 
retire  past  the  age  of  65.  This  assumption  was 
also  made  in  the  2008  government  proposal  to 
introduce a retirement window between the ages 
of  65  and  70,  which  still  has  to  be  discussed  in 
parliament. This proposal, that is designed in an 
actuarially  neutral  way,  will  still  incur  costs 
because of adverse selection. People with a higher 
life expectancy are more likely to opt for delaying 
the  state  pension.  By  excluding  the  people  who 
died  before  the  age  of  70  from  delaying  their 
pension, average life expectancy of those who did 
opt  for  delaying  is  about  one  year  above  the 
average, which is in line with findings on adverse 
selection  in  the  German  retirement  system  by 
Kühntopf and Tivig (2008). 
                                                 
3   In the Netherlands, the unemployment benefit 
currently lasts for a maximum of five years for 
people aged 60 and over. The unemployment 
benefit  itself  lasts  for  a  maximum  of  three 
years  and  two  months  and  the  subsequent 
benefit  for  people  aged  60  years  and  over 
complements the time until retirement. 
5.  MODEL RESULTS 
This  section  gives  the  results  of  the  baseline 
scenario  of  unchanged  pension  policies.  Section 
5.1  focuses  on  the  demographic  and  budgetary 
results. These results are up-to-date projections, 
using the demographic and budgetary modules of 
SADNAP  that  were  already  in  use.  Sections  5.2 
and 5.3 focus on the redistribution within the state 
pension  system  and  the  retirement  decisions  of 
older workers. These results come from the new 
SADNAP modules described in this paper. Section 
5.4 compares the SADNAP results to results from 
other comparable models. 
5.1.  Budgetary results 
The population of the Netherlands is not predicted 
to  grow  much  in  the  future,  but  its  composition 
will  change  significantly.  The  number  of  people 
aged  65  and  over  increases  from  2.5  million  in 
2009 to 4.5 million in 2040. The number of people 
aged 20-64 decreases from 10.1 million in 2009 to 
9.2 million in 2040. Therefore the so-called grey 
pressure  (the  number  of  persons  aged  65  years 
and older as a percentage of the number of people 
aged 20–64 years) doubles from 25% in 2009 to 
49% in 2040. 
 
When pensions stabilize at the current level in real 
terms,  the  state  pension  costs  will  rise  from  € 
27.7 billion in 2009 to € 50.3 billion in 2040. In 
terms of GDP, assuming that GDP also stabilizes 
at  the  current  (2009)  level,  the  state  pension 
costs will rise from 4.8% in 2009 to 8.8% in 2040. 
The  rise  is  huge,  but  still  somewhat  less  than 
expected if constant pension costs per pensioner 
were  assumed.  In  that  case  state  pension  costs 
would  rise  to  €  51.9  billion  in  2040  or  9.1%  of 
current GDP. Apparently, the cost per person will 
decrease.  This  mitigates  the  increasing  pressure 
on  the  system  from  the  newest  population 
projection  (CBS,  2009)  which  predicts  increasing 
longevity.  If  the  former  projection  (CBS,  2007) 
had been used instead, state pension costs would 
have  risen  to  €  47.7  billion  or  8.3%  of  GDP  in 
2040, 0.5% less than the forecast based on the 
newest  projection.  Figure  3  gives  the  current 
SADNAP  projection  in  percentage  of  GDP 
decomposed  in  state  pensions  and  partner 
allowances. It shows how the state pension costs 
after  the  ageing  peak  around  2040  stabilize  on 
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Figure 3  State pension cost as % of GDP (including partner allowances) 2009-2080   
 
 
In reality, of course pensions will increase in real 
terms,  as  GDP  does.  Van  Ewijk  et  al.  (2006) 
assume for the oncoming decades state pensions 
to increase by 1.7% a year in real terms and GDP 
to  grow  by  1.4%  a  year  in  real  terms.  If  that 
assumption holds true, in terms of percentage of 
GDP, the state pension costs will rise from 4.8% 
in  2009  to  9.6%  in  2040  as  GDP  grows  more 
slowly than the state pensions in real terms.  
 
There  are  several  reasons  for  the  lower  than 
expected rise of the state pension costs. From the 
simulation  results,  it  appears  that  not  only  does 
the  size  of  the  population  of  pensioners  change 
but  that  its  composition  changes  as  well.  In 
particular, three trends are important. First, when 
studying  the  composition  of  the  pensioner 
population by origin, it appears that the share of 
immigrants is rising. This holds true especially for 
the first generation immigrants. Their share in the 
population aged 65 and over almost doubles from 
8.7%  in  2009  to  15.6%  in  2040.  Most  first 
generation  immigrants  have  an  incomplete  state 
pension  (unless  they  immigrated  to  the 
Netherlands  before  age  15).  Emigrants  will  also 
have a reduced state pension and their number is 
growing as well. The number of reduced pensions 
is therefore rising, from 15.0% in 2009 to 27.5% 
in 2040.  
 
The  second  is  the  development  of  the  share  of 
cohabitants  in  the  pensioner  population.  This 
result is less clear-cut. In the short term the share 
of  cohabitants  among  pensioners  is  increasing. 
This reflects the trend seen in recent state pension 
realizations  and  is  caused  by  the  increasing  life 
expectancy.  Partners  live  together  for  a  longer 
time after reaching the age of 65. For the same 
reason, in a recent study by Poos et al. (2008), a 
decrease in health care costs is predicted for the 
forthcoming  decade.  However,  after  2020  the 
percentage of singles starts increasing again. This 
can be explained by the socio-economic trend that 
fewer people become cohabitant or married. This 
trend  finally  overshadows  the  current  trend  of 
increasing numbers of cohabitants because of the 
rising life expectancy. Already in 2040, the share 
of single persons among pensioners is above the 
current level. After 2040 the share of singles will 
stabilize  at  a  level  above  the  current  and  put 
additional pressure on state pension costs.  
 
A  third  important  trend  is  the  rising  labour 
participation over time, especially among women. 
This influences the number of people qualifying for 
the partner allowance. These allowances currently 
account for € 1.4 billion. A person qualifies for the 
partner  allowance  when  he  or  she  turns  65  and 
has a partner who is younger than 65 and does 
not  earn  enough  income  of  their  own
4.  Most  of 
those  who  qualify  for  the  partner  allowance  are 
men. Men tend to have a wife who is on average 
three  years  younger,  and  labour  participation 
among  older  women  is  still  particularly  low.  In 
                                                 
4   When the partner earns an income below 15% 
of the minimum wage, a full partner allowance 
of up to 50% of the minimum wage is given. 
When  the  partner  earns  an  income  between 
15% and 97.5% of the minimum wage (SVB, 
2008),  a  reduced  partner  allowance  is  given. 
When  the  partner  earns  more  than  97.5%  of 


















































































































state pensionVAN SONSBEEK      Micro simulations on the effects of ageing-related policy measures: The Social Affairs Department of 
the Netherlands Ageing and Pensions Model 
  83 
fact,  the  majority  of  men  turning  65  currently 
qualifies  for  the  partner  allowance.  However,  as 
the  labour  participation  among  women  is  rising, 
this  number  will  be  decreasing  in  the  future. 
Therefore, the costs of the partner allowances will 
grow slowly until 2013, then stabilize more or less 
on the same level and decrease slowly after 2035. 
In the meantime the share of women in the age 
category  60-64  who  participate  in  the  labour 
market will have doubled. In 2040 the costs of the 
partner allowance will be almost equal to 2009.  
 
Figure 4 shows all three trends. In sum, the cost 
per  person  accounts  for  a  reduction  of  state 
pension  cost  equivalent  to  0.3%  of  GDP.  The 
rising  share  of  reduced  state  pensions,  mainly 
because  of  the  rising  share  of  first  generation 
immigrants  and  the  rising  labour  participation  of 
women each account for 0.2%. The development 
in the share of single persons in the population of 
pensioners has a small upward effect of 0.1% of 
GDP in 2040.
Figure 4  Changes in composition of pensioners population (2006-2050) 
 
 
5.2.  Redistribution 
Redistribution within the scheme is investigated in 
detail  by  computing  the  share  of  lifetime  state 
pension income taken by different subgroups. The 
lifetime  state  pension  income  is  computed  by 
accumulating  incomes  from  the  year  a  person 
turns  65  until  the  year  a  person  dies.  For  this 
analysis,  the  2006-2045  pensioner  cohorts  (the 
1941-1980  birth  cohorts)  are  aggregated.  The 
average lifetime state pension income per person 
is  around  €  190,000,  with  lifetime  income  per 
person decreasing for the later cohorts because of 
the rising number of people with incomplete state 
pension entitlements. Table 3 shows a subdivision 
of the accumulated cohorts by subgroup, with the 
share  of  each  subgroup  in  the  cohorts  of 
pensioners,  its  share  of  lifetime  state  pension 
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Table 3  Share of lifetime state pension income compared to share of state pension cohorts 
Subgroup  Share of cohorts turning 
65 
Share of lifetime pension 
costs 
Ratio 
By income       
-  1
st quintile  19.4%  15.4%  0.79 
-  2
nd quintile  19.8%  18.5%  0.93 
-  3
rd quintile  20.0%  19.4%  0.97 
-  4
th quintile  20.3%  21.8%  1.08 
-  5
th quintile  20.5%  24.9%  1.21 
By gender          
-  Women  49.4%  52.6%  1.06 
-  Men  50.6%  47.4%  0.94 
By household status          
-  Singles  30.6%  34.0%  1.11 
-  Cohabitants  69.4%  66.0%  0.95 
By origin          
-  Natives  73.5%  82.4%  1.12 
-  Immigrants  26.5%  17.6%  0.66 
 
The  higher  income  quintiles  receive  an  above-
average  share  of  total  state  pension  because  of 
differences  in  life  expectancy.  This  redistribution 
through  life  expectancy  is  substantial.  The  first 
income  quintile  receives  more  than  a  third  less 
than the fifth income quintile (a ratio of 0.79 vs. a 
ratio of 1.21). This is mainly due to the difference 
in life expectancy, but also to the larger share of 
incomplete  state  pensions  in  the  lower  income 
quintiles. Women receive 6% more state pension 
from  the  scheme  than  their  share  in  the  cohort 
would  justify.  Singles  receive  11%  more  state 
pension from the scheme than their share in the 
cohort would justify. This is because the lower life 
expectancy of singles is overcompensated by their 
higher  state  pension.  Immigrants  receive  34% 
less  state  pension  from  the  scheme  than  their 
share  in  the  cohort  would  justify.  However,  this 
large  difference  is  primarily  due  to  immigrants 
building  up less  entitlement  during  their life  and 
only  for  a  smaller  part  due  to  differences  in  life 
expectancy. 
5.3.  Retirement decision 
The  participation  transitions  after  age  60  in 
SADNAP  are  modelled  through  the  behavioural 
option  value  model  described  in  section  4.  The 
participation  rates  at  age  60  are  given  by  the 
participation status model from appendix A.3 and 
are  similar  to  the  participation  rates  for  people 
aged  60  as  projected  by  CPB.  The  retirement 
decision is determined by the option value model 
only  for  those  still  working  at  age  60.  This 
excludes about 40% of the cohorts as even in the 
long run some 30% of the men aged 60 and 50% 
of the women aged 60 will be in receipt of benefits 
or not participating in the labour market at all.  
 
When the distribution of individual retirement ages 
is studied, we find spikes at certain pivotal ages. 
This  is  a  well  known  phenomenon  (e.g. 
Lumsdaine,  Stock  and  Wise,  1995  and  Gustman 
and  Steinmeier,  2005)  which  can  be  partly 
explained by retirement taking place according to 
social-cultural norms, but also partly by economic 
reasons.  As  the  models,  like  the  option  value 
approach  we  use,  only  take  the  latter  into 
account,  they  usually  underestimate  the  spikes. 
For  the  Netherlands,  Nelissen  (2002)  finds  a 
strong preference for individuals to retire either at 
the first or the last possible retirement age. In the 
Netherlands, the first possible retirement age used 
to  be  60  years  in  many  sectors.  Since  the  late 
1980s  for  most  employees  a  generous  early 
retirement  scheme  existed  that  guaranteed  an 
income level of 70-80% of the final wage without 
loss  of  pension  accruals  from  60  years  of  age 
onwards.  As  a  result,  most  people  did  indeed 
retire  at  age  60  (Euwals,  de  Mooij  and  van 
Vuuren,  2009).  Gradually,  the  generous  early 
retirement  schemes  are  being  replaced  by 
actuarially  neutral  schemes  until,  from  2015 
onwards, all schemes are fully actuarially neutral 
(Bovenberg and Gradus, 2008). The last possible 
retirement  age  in  the  Netherlands  for  most 
employees  is  still  65.  At  that  age,  the  state 
pension  starts  being  paid  and  most  employees 
automatically have their employment terminated. 
However,  the  Dutch  government  has  sent  a 
proposal  to  parliament  to  abolish  the  automatic 
process  of  employees  being  fired  at  65  and  to 
allow  delaying  the  state  pension  to  70  years  of 
age instead of the current 65.  
 
When  the  retirement  decisions  in  SADNAP  are 
evaluated,  indeed,  when  the  generous  early 
retirement  scheme  is  in  place,  the  majority  of 
retirement decisions takes place at 60, the earliest 
possible age. In a fully actuarially neutral scheme 
(assuming a last possible retirement age of 70), 
the  model  predicts  two  spikes  in  retirement,  a 
large  one  at  65  and  a  smaller  one  at  the  last 
possible retirement age. The lines in figure 5 show 
these retirement patterns. The dashed line gives 
the retirement pattern of the birth cohorts 1946-
1950 (those that turn 60 between 2006 and 2010) VAN SONSBEEK      Micro simulations on the effects of ageing-related policy measures: The Social Affairs Department of 
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when the generous early retirement scheme would 
still  have  been  in  place  (assuming  80%  of  the 
working population to be covered by this generous 
ERS providing an income level of 75% of the wage 
at  age  60).  The  solid  line  gives  the  retirement 
pattern  of  the  same  cohort  in  an  actuarially 
neutral  early  retirement  scheme.  The  average 
retirement  age  rises by  2.5  years  for those  who 
are  working  at  least  until  60  in  the  actuarially 
neutral  scenario.  The  bold  line  gives  the 
retirement pattern of the birth cohorts 1966-1970 
(those who turn 60 between 2026 and 2030). The 
share  of  non/participants  at  age  59  decreases 
from  54%  to  39%  between  those  cohorts.  The 
average retirement age for the entire population 
rises by one year (from 61,9 to 62,8) because of 
the higher number of people working at least until 
60. 
Figure 5  Projected rate of non-participation in the labour force non-participation rate by age  
 
 
The  average  retirement  age  increases  with  2.5 
years for the population still participating at age 
60. Results in the same order of magnitude were 
found  by  de  Vos  and  Kapteyn  (2004),  who 
simulated  the  effect  of  a  change  from  the 
generous ERS that existed in the Netherlands at 
the  time  to  a  more  or  less  actuarially  neutral 
scheme.  They  forecasted  an  increase  in  average 
retirement  age  of  four  years  for  males  and 
insignificant  changes  for  women  with  the  option 
value model, which in the same study they found 
to  perform  better  than  the  peak  value  model  in 
the baseline estimation. In 2007, retirement age 
had indeed increased by two years to 61.7 years 
from  below  60  during  the  1990s  when  the 
generous early retirement schemes were common 
(Advies  Commissie  Arbeidsparticipatie,  2008). 
However,  even  when  the  generous  early 
retirement schemes were common, a fair share of 
workers continued working until 65 or later. This 
concerns  mainly  the  self-employed  and  also 
employees  not  covered  by  collective  agreements 
on early retirement. On the other hand, 40% of 
the  population  is  no  longer  participating  in  the 
workforce at age 60, which still leaves important 
participation gains to be made.  
 
The model predicts 26% of the people working at 
60 to retire before 65, 38% to retire at 65 and the 
other 36% to retire past 65. Those retiring early 
are  the  ones  with  high  time  preference,  high 
leisure  preference  or  high  expected  wage 
decrease,  or  they  are  risk-averse,  or  a 
combination  of  the  above.  The  influence  of  time 
preference  and  leisure  preference  seems  to  be 
dominant.  Also,  disability  is  an  important  factor 
causing  early  retirement  for  about  one  in  six 
retirees who retire early. As the disability scheme 
in the Netherlands currently is so strict that abuse 
of the scheme as a means of early retirement is 
virtually impossible, the unemployment scheme is 
nowadays  often  used  as  an  early  retirement 
pathway  at  all  ages.  Table  4  gives  a 
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Table 4  Characteristics of retirees by retirement age (birth cohorts 1946-1970) 
Retirement 
age 











≤ 59  0.427           
60  0.029  0.26  2.15  0.70  0.046  0.14 
61  0.025  0.21  2.07  0.70  0.046  0.16 
62  0.027  0.20  2.04  0.70  0.046  0.17 
63  0.035  0.21  2.04  0.70  0.047  0.14 
64  0.036  0.21  2.07  0.70  0.048  0.18 
65  0.217  0.20  2.05  0.69  0.046  0.03 
66  0.043  0.14  1.97  0.70  0.046  0.14 
67  0.042  0.13  1.97  0.71  0.046  0.15 
68  0.040  0.12  1.94  0.71  0.045  0.14 
69  0.080  0.08  1.81  0.73  0.039  0.06 
 
The  SADNAP  model  rightly  predicts  a  strong 
preference  for  retiring  at  65,  the  year  the  state 
pension (and partner allowance) start being paid. 
However, the number of people working on past 
65 is slightly higher than the levels currently seen, 
especially  for  women.  The  abolition  of  the 
automatic termination of employees at 65, which 
is  expected  soon,  will  probably  influence  current 
retirement patterns. Moreover, it is known (Coile, 
2004)  that  husbands’  and  wives’  retirement 
behaviour  is  influenced  not  only  by  their  own 
financial  incentives  but  also  by  spill-over  effects 
from their spouses’ incentives, which may explain 
why women’s retirement age is overestimated by 
the option value algorithm. The SADNAP estimates 
may  give  a  good  estimate  of  the  retirement 
patterns that will be realized when the automatic 
firing of employees at 65 has been abolished and 
when  all  early  retirement  schemes  that  are 
rewarding  early  retirement  are  abolished. 
However,  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  such  a 
substantial part of the whole population of males 
and  females  will  retire  at  the  last  possible 
retirement age when that last possible retirement 
age is increased to 70. 
5.4.  Validation  and  comparison  to  other 
models 
The demographic model results are benchmarked 
with  the  official  population  forecast  of  the  CBS. 
The SADNAP estimates in all years stay within a 
margin  of  1%  of  the  comparable  CBS  estimates 
for main age groups. There is no exact match with 
macro  population  numbers  as  only  the  yearly 
number  of  births  and  immigrants  and  mortality 
and emigration rates are aligned to CBS forecasts. 
The grey pressure, a key indicator, equals 49% in 
2040 in both SADNAP and the CBS-projection. 
 
The financial forecast compares well to the earlier 
macro calculations of Van Ewijk et al. (2006), who 
forecasted a rise in state pension cost from 4.7% 
of GDP in 2006 to 8.8% of GDP in 2040, based on 
the  2004  population  forecast  of  CBS.  As  in  the 
2008  population  forecast  the  number  of  people 
aged 65 and over in 2040 is 12% higher than in 
the 2004 forecast, an update of the calculations of 
van Ewijk et al. based on the newest population 
projection would lead to an estimate of 9.9% of 
GDP  in  2040.  The  difference  with  the  9.6%  is 
caused by the decreasing cost per person that was 
not taken into account in the macro approach. 
 
The  short-term  forecast  of  number  of  state 
pensioners  and  state  pension  costs  gives 
comparable  results  for  2009.  The  number  of 
pensioners is 0.6% lower than the 2009 estimate 
of SVB, the pension administration office. In later 
years  the  SADNAP  estimates  point  to  slightly 
higher  state  pension  costs  and  a  slightly  higher 
number of state pensioners. In 2024, the last year 
of the SVB forecast, the number of pensioners is 
0.2% higher than the SVB estimate.  
 
Recent studies report mixed findings on whether 
people  actually  reach  their  target  of  a  70% 
replacement rate (total pension as a percentage of 
the  final  wage).  Statistics  Netherlands  (CBS, 
2008)  finds  that  a  gross  income  level  of  on 
average 73% of the final wage is to be expected 
for the cohorts currently saving for their pension. 
The  SADNAP  results  show  the  same  average 
replacement rate. Moreover, in a micro simulation 
study  on  the  wealth  of  Dutch  pensioners  (SZW, 
2006) the income position of pensioners is found 
to improve substantially as a consequence of more 
second  and  third-pillar  pension  savings  by 
younger  generations.  The  researchers  show  the 
average net income of the 65-69 years olds to rise 
to 102% of the income of the 60-64 years olds in 
2030 as compared to 92% in 2010. Knoef, Alessie 
and Kalwij (2009) also report that between 2008 
and  2020  mean  equivalised  household  income 
increases  by  11-14%  for  the  retirees.  However, 
Euwals, de Mooij and van Vuuren (2009) find that 
when  the  consequences  of  the  career  average 
system to which most pension funds have recently 
switched  are  taken  into  account,  the  younger 
generations have lower replacement rates, up to 
less  than  50%  for  the  birth  cohorts  1972-1976 
(weighted  average  of  all  cohorts  64%).  The 
SADNAP results show rising replacement rates and 
are in line with the estimates of SZW and Knoef, 
Alessie and Kalwij. VAN SONSBEEK      Micro simulations on the effects of ageing-related policy measures: The Social Affairs Department of 
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Few  comparable  studies  are  available  on 
redistribution.  Knoef,  Alessie  and  Kalwij  (2009) 
report a Gini-coefficient of 0.23 for the population 
of  retirees,  based  on  equivalised  household 
income.  This  is  well  below  the  Gini-coefficient of 
0.29 as reported by SADNAP, which is based on 
individual  income.  However,  a  lower  Gini-
coefficient  when  comparing  household  income  is 
plausible  because  higher  income  earners  (mainly 
males)  usually  have  younger  partners,  so  their 
income  will  generally  be  shared  with  a  partner, 
decreasing the level of inequality measured. 
 
The  average  retirement  age  increases  by  2.5 
years as compared to the benchmark scenario of a 
generous early retirement system. Results in the 
same order of magnitude were reported by de Vos 
and Kapteyn (2004), as described in section 5.3, 
and  Euwals  de  Mooij  and  van  Vuuren  (2009). 
Table 5 gives an overview of some key SADNAP 
results and some comparable estimates.
Table 5  Overview of key SADNAP results compared to other models 





Grey pressure  2040  49%  49%  CBS 
State pension expenses   2040  9.6%  8.8%  CPB based on 2004 population projection, would 
be 9.9% based on 2008 population projection 
Number  of  state 
pensions  
2024  4.132 mln  4.125 mln  SVB 2009-2024 projection 
Expected  replacement 
rate when retiring 
All  0.73  0.73 
0.64 
CBS 
Euwals, de Mooij, van Vuuren (2009) 
Gini coefficient  2040  0.29  0.23  Knoef  et  al.  on  household  income  (SADNAP 
estimate on individual income) 
Retirement age  2007  61.9  61.7  Adviescommissie Arbeidparticipatie (2008) 
Retirement age increase 
(compared  to  generous 
ERS) 
2015  2.5  4 / 0 
2 – 2.5 
De Vos and Kapteyn for men / women 
Euwals, de Mooij, van Vuuren (2009) 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS AND TOPICS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
Like most other OECD countries, the Netherlands 
is facing an ageing population, causing a burden 
on  the  public  finances.  A  significant  part  of  the 
rise in public expenses will be caused by the rise 
in  costs  for  the  state  pensions.  The  old-age 
dependency  ratio  almost  doubles  from  now  until 
2040  (the  peak  of  the  ageing  process  in  the 
Netherlands).  
 
The  dynamic  population  micro  simulation  model 
SADNAP is developed for calculating the financial 
and economic implications of the ageing problem 
and  of  the  relevant  policy  measures  considered. 
The model uses administrative datasets on state 
pension payments, state pension entitlements and 
private  pension  entitlements.  Life  paths  are 
constructed for a sample of the Dutch population, 
including  immigration  and  emigration,  household 
formation and labour participation. In this paper, 
two extensions of the model are elaborated. First, 
because  of  improvement  of  the  income  data 
sources  and  differentiation  of  mortality  rates, 
redistribution  within  the pensions  system  can  be 
analysed.  Second,  the  retirement  decision  is 
modelled  based  on  the  Stock  and  Wise  option 
value approach, allowing for individual variation in 
the  main  option  value  parameters  based  on 
literature  review  in  order  to  make  use  of  the 
added value of micro simulation. 
 
It is shown that in the baseline scenario the state 
pension costs rise less sharply than the number of 
pensioners.  The  composition  of  the  pensioner 
population is changing. The number of immigrants 
with reduced state pensions is rising. During the 
forthcoming  decades,  the  proportion  of  single 
persons  among  the  pensioner  population  is 
decreasing, however, this trend will be reversed in 
the future. Also the rising labour participation of 
women decreases the cost of partner allowances. 
The  downward  influences  together  amount  to 
0.3% of GDP in 2040. This partly compensates for 
the increasing longevity from the latest population 
forecast. 
 
The  intra-generational  redistribution  within  the 
Dutch pension scheme is shown to be substantial. 
The  bottom  income  quintile  receives  less  out  of 
the  system,  a  discount  of  more  than  one-third, 
than  the  top  income  quintile,  mainly  because  of 
lower life expectancy. Singles, however, get more 
out of the system than partners in a couple. Their 
higher pension compensates for their shorter life 
expectancy. 
 
The modelling of the retirement decision through 
the  option  value  model  confirms  the  retirement 
patterns  experienced  in  the  Netherlands  when  a 
very generous early retirement scheme was still in 
place. Average retirement age for those who are 
still working at 60 can rise by 2.5 years when the 
early  retirement  schemes  have  become  fully 
actuarially  neutral.  In  the  actuarially  neutral 
scheme, a strong preference for either retiring at 
65 or at the last retirement age is suggested. The VAN SONSBEEK      Micro simulations on the effects of ageing-related policy measures: The Social Affairs Department of 
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time preference and leisure preference parameters 
appear  to  be the  most important  drivers  for  the 
retirement  decision.  An  assumption  of  wage 
decrease is added to the model in order to obtain 
more plausible results and less people working on 
until  the  last  possible  retirement  age.  Another 
important  factor  is  the  role  of  disability  and 
unemployment.  The  unemployment  scheme 
especially  is  still  used  as  an  early  retirement 
pathway.  
 
Future  research  will  focus  on  evaluating  policy 
options  with  the  model.  New  datasets  on  state 
pensions  and  private  pensions  will  become 
available  for  more  recent  years  and  more 
information  on  third-pillar  pensions  and  financial 
wealth  will  become  available  on  the  micro  level. 
Also,  the  availability  of  linkable  datasets  of 
different years will allow for an estimation of the 
option value parameters and their distribution. 
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Appendix A - The SADNAP Model 
 
This appendix gives a more detailed description of 
the SADNAP model. The model is programmed in 
SAS  and  consists  of  different  modules  on 
demographics,  household  formation,  labour 
participation  and  the  retirement  decision,  which 
are described subsequently in sections A.1 to A.3.  
A.1 The demographic model 
Before  the  simulation  starts,  a  base  data  file  is 
created out of the source files described in section 
3. Three different data sources are combined into 
a single file containing a representative sample of 
the  Dutch  population  in  the  base  year  (2006). 
Aggregate CBS data on the population aged 0-15 
years  are  used  in  the  base  year.  For  the 
population aged 15-64 years, the micro datasets 
from  CBS  on  state  pension  entitlements  and 
private  pension  entitlements  as  described  in 
section  3.2  are  used.  Finally  the  micro  dataset 
from SVB on state pension payments as described 
in section 3.1 is used for the population aged 65 
and  over.  These  three  datasets  complete  the 
population  for  the  base  year.  The  records  for 
people younger than 15 years are constructed by 
using  general  demographic  CBS  statistics  on  the 
age, gender and ethnic composition of the Dutch 
population. As state pension entitlements are zero 
until  persons  turn  15,  and  children  do  not  have 
wages  or  private  pension  entitlements,  no 
additional information on this group is needed.  
 
The CBS file with entitlement data for people aged 
15-64  has  another  year of  origin  (namely  2005) 
than  the  SVB  file  with  payment  data  for  people 
aged over 65 (namely 2006). Therefore, the 2005 
population  aged  15-64  is  simulated  towards  a 
population aged 16-65 in 2006. A population can 
change  by  four  demographic  events;  births, 
deaths, immigration, and emigration. Births do not 
affect  the  population  aged  15-64  in  one  year  of 
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made  subject  to  mortality,  immigration,  and 
emigration.  After  this  first  simulation  the  2005 
population is aged 16-65. Because richer data are 
available for people aged over 65 in 2006, persons 
aged 65 are deleted from the simulation. All age 
groups are added together to complete the base 
dataset. 
 
For  each  simulation  year,  records  for  the  new 
births and the new immigrants are added, based 
on the macro data sources as described in section 
3.3.  When  applying  the  mortality  rates  and 
emigration  rates  as  derived  from  the  CBS 
population  projection,  an  accurate  population 
forecast results. Stocks, flows and rates from the 
CBS are available until 2050. After 2050, the 2050 
numbers are kept constant.  
 
Although  there  is  now  an  accurate  population 
forecast, there is still a problem left relating to the 
complexity  of  the  modelling  of  immigration  and 
emigration.  Also  “remigration”  needs  to  be 
modelled.  This  is  important  because  on  average 
during  the  last  few  years  about  50%  of  the 
emigrants are former immigrants and about 20% 
of  the  immigrants  are  former  emigrants.  By  not 
allowing for remigration, the share of immigrants 
in  the  population  will  clearly  be  overestimated. 
The  former  (immigrants  having  a  greater 
emigration  rate)  can  easily  be  implemented  by 
using different sets of emigration rates depending 
on  whether  the  emigrant  was  born  in  the 
Netherlands  or  not.  The  latter  is  more  difficult. 
Few  of  the  larger  simulation  models,  notably 
Lifepaths and Sesim (Pennec and Keegan, 2007) 
allow  for  emigrants  re-entering  the  population. 
SADNAP  ignores  repatriation  of  emigrants, 
resulting  at  the  micro  level  in  a  slight 
overrepresentation  of  small  entitlements  as 
returning  emigrants  continue  building  up  their 
already existing rights, whereas SADNAP assumes 
these rights to consist of separate parts belonging 
to two separate persons.  
 
Moreover, still missing is a part of the population 
that  will  be  entitled  to  a  state  pension  in  the 
future,  but  is  not  living  in  the  Netherlands 
anymore. As can be seen from table 1, 9% of the 
current population of pensioners is living abroad. 
Since emigration is modelled, the model captures 
all future pensioners who live in the Netherlands 
in the base year, but will emigrate in the future. 
However, we still miss the people aged between 
15  and  64  in  the  base  year  who  built  up  state 
pension  entitlements  in  the  Netherlands  in  the 
past  but  emigrated  before  the  base  year.  To 
correct  for  this,  records  are  added  for  former 
emigrants.  As  a  starting  point,  the  youngest 
cohort of pensioners in the base year is used. Of 
this  cohort  also  9%  of  the  pensioners  are  living 
abroad. From the state pension entitlement, their 
year  of  emigration  can  be  estimated.  Everybody 
missing  one  year  of  entitlement  is  assumed  to 
have emigrated at age 64, everybody missing two 
years at age 63 and so on. As in the simulation, 
people aged 64 in the base year can emigrate in 
the first year of the simulation, after that first year 
of the simulation only the claimants living abroad 
who emigrated at age 63 or younger have to be 
added.  According  to  SVB  (2008),  non-take-up 
among people living abroad is common, hence a 
correction is made, based on the assumption that 
the younger one emigrated, the less likely one is 
to claim a Dutch state pension.  
 
The whole process described above is represented 
in  figure  6.  The  filled boxes  represent the  micro 
databases  from  the  base  years  that  are  used  in 
the simulation and the blank boxes represent the 
micro data that are constructed from macro data 
sources in order to add new cohorts to the base 
year data.VAN SONSBEEK      Micro simulations on the effects of ageing-related policy measures: The Social Affairs Department of 
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Figure 7 shows the composition of the simulation 
database, based on a 1% sample and extrapolated 
to the whole population. The numbers add up to 
more  than  the  population  of  the  Netherlands  as 
the life paths of immigrants are taken into account 
before they immigrate to the Netherlands and the 
life  paths  of  emigrants  are  taken  into  account 
after  they  leave  the  Netherlands.  In  2080,  the 
final year of the simulation, the base year micro 
data sets will almost completely have phased out 
and will have been replaced by persons from the 
constructed datasets from 2006 onwards.
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Figure 7  Composition of the simulated database from different data sources 
 
 
A.2 The household formation model 
In  the  next  steps  variables  are  added  to  the 
demographic  model,  such  as  household  type. 
From  the  databases  of  pension  entitlements  and 
pension  payments,  the  household  status  of  all 
individuals  aged  15  and  over  is  known.  SADNAP 
distinguishes  between  single  persons  and 
cohabitants  only
5.  The  aggregated  state  pension 
for two singles is higher than the aggregated state 
pension of two partners in a couple.  
                                                 
5   In  the  Netherlands,  the  state  pension  system 
treats (formal) cohabitation in the same way as 
being married. 
 
Age-  and  gender-dependent  transition 
probabilities are used to determine whether single 
persons  remain  single  or  start  cohabiting  and 
whether cohabitants separate and become single 
or  stay  together.  The  transition  probabilities  can 
be  derived  from  the  age-  and  gender-specific 
household  forecast  from  CBS  as  described  in 
section 3.3. 
 
When  PS  denotes  the  probability  of  being  single 
and PC the probability of cohabiting, the transition 
probabilities  PSC  (probability  of  a  single  person 
cohabiting the next year) and PCS (probability of a 
cohabitant being single again the next year) can 
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(3) ,-.￿￿age,gender￿ ￿ &1 $
567￿89:,9:;<:=￿
567>?￿89:￿￿,9:;<:=￿+ ￿  @￿age,gender￿  
if  ,-￿￿age,gender￿ < ,-￿￿￿￿age $ 1,gender￿ 
(4) ,-.￿￿age,gender￿ ￿ @￿age,gender￿  
if  ,-￿￿age,gender￿ >= ,-￿￿￿￿age $ 1,gender￿ 
(5) ,.-￿￿age,gender￿ ￿ &1 $
5A7￿89:,9:;<:=￿
5A7>?￿89:￿￿,9:;<:=￿+ ￿  @￿age,gender￿ 
if  ,.￿￿age,gender￿ < ,.￿￿￿￿age $ 1,gender￿ 
(6) ,.-￿￿age,gender￿ ￿ @￿age,gender￿  
if  ,.￿￿age,gender￿ >= ,.￿￿￿￿age $ 1,gender￿ 
If the correction terms ε(age, gender) are set to 
zero,  most  individuals  will  have  only  one  lasting 
relationship  during  their  lifetime.  The  higher  the 
correction  terms  are  set,  the  more  relationships 
will  be  started  and  finished  each  year.  The 
correction  terms  can  be  used  to  align  the 
simulation  to  the  information  on  household 
formation and dissolution from the CBS household 
forecast. In the baseline scenario, the terms are 
set to zero. 
However,  by  introducing  differences  in  mortality 
rates  (see  section  3),  a  deviation  is  introduced 
from  the  original  population  projection  in  the 
numbers of singles and cohabitants by age. As the 
household formation model from appendix A.2 is 
based  on  the  original  population  projection,  the 
numbers need to be realigned in order to match 
the  original  population  projection  again. 
Concretely, the equations (3) and (5) need to be 
adapted as the probabilities of singles cohabiting 
need  to  decrease  and  the  probabilities  of 
cohabitants  becoming  single  again  need  to 
increase. 
 
(7) ,-.￿￿age,gender￿ ￿ ,-.￿￿age,gender￿ $ B￿￿age,gender￿  
if  ,-￿￿age,gender￿ < ,-￿￿￿￿age $ 1,gender￿ 
(8) ,.-￿￿age,gender￿ ￿ ,.-￿￿age,gender￿ ￿ C￿￿age,gender￿ 
if  ,.￿￿age,gender￿ < ,.￿￿￿￿age $ 1,gender￿ 
In  some  larger  micro  simulation  models,  the 
cohabiting  process  is  very  elaborate.  Those 
models  contain  a  formalized  mate  matching 
module  in  which  partners  are  found  within  the 
model based on certain matching criteria (for an 
overview of methods see Perese (2002) and for an 
overview  of  models  see  Bacon  and  Pennec 
(2007)).  SADNAP  follows  a  simple  approach,  in 
which the important characteristics of the partner 
are  determined  as  soon  as  those  characteristics 
become relevant for the model calculations. In the 
ageing  calculations  the  gender,  age  and 
participation  status  of  the  partner  are  the  most 
important  characteristics.  The  gender  of  the 
partner is assumed always to be the opposite of 
the gender of the other partner. From the dataset 
of  state  pension  payments,  detailed  information 
on  the  age  difference  between  partners  of  a 
couple is available. The age differences from the 
youngest  cohort  of  this  dataset  (the  1941  birth 
cohort) are used, assuming that the distribution of 
age  differences  in  relationships  will  remain  the 
same in the future. Given the gender and age of a 
partner,  the  corresponding  participation  rate  can 
be  derived  from  the  age  and  gender  specific 
participation estimates as described in section 3.3.  
At  this  point  enough  information  is  available  to 
calculate  the  costs  of  the  state  pension. 
Information  is  available  on  the  future  population 
size and its division by ages. Starting with current 
state  pension  entitlements,  the  building  up  of 
entitlements  in  the  future  can  be  simulated.  As 
information  on  the  household  type  is  also 
available,  by  adding  benefit  levels  to  the  model, 
the future state pension benefits of all individuals 
can  be  simulated.  The  total  costs  for  the  state 
pension  can  be  calculated  by  aggregating  the 
individual  benefits.  All  calculations  within  the 
model are done at the current price level.  
A.3 The participation status model 
From  the  database  of  pension  entitlements,  the 
labour market status of all individuals aged 15 to 
64  is  also  known.  Participants  can  be  either 
employees  or  self-employed.  The  self-employed, 
for  whom  we  have  no  data  on  private  pension 
savings,  are  treated  by  assuming  their  pension 
savings  on  average  to  be  equal  to  those  of  the 
employees.  Non-participants  can  be  either 
studying, receiving a benefit, early retired or not 
participating at all. Figure 8 shows the distribution 
of  the  2005  Dutch  population  by  age  and  by 
participation category.VAN SONSBEEK      Micro simulations on the effects of ageing-related policy measures: The Social Affairs Department of 
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Figure 8  Composition of the 2005 population by age and participation category 
 
 
One  of  the  most  striking  conclusions  from  the 
above  graph  is  that  in  the  last  couple  of  years 
before the statutory retirement age of 65, only a 
small  minority  of  the  population  is  still  working. 
This  is  mainly  due  to  the  popularity  of  early 
retirement  schemes  and  the  use  of  benefits, 
especially  disability  and  unemployment,  as  an 
early  exit  route  (see  e.g.  Kapteyn  and  de  Vos, 
2004). For example, of the 64 year olds, only 11% 
are  working,  whereas  27%  are  on  benefit  and 
39% are early retired. However, the participation 
rate among the 60-64 years old is currently rising 
due to policy changes, especially regarding early 
retirement  schemes  and  disability  insurance 
(Euwals, de Mooij and van Vuuren, 2009). 
 
In SADNAP, age and gender dependent transition 
probabilities  are  used  to  determine  whether 
participants continue participating or become non-
participants,  and  vice  versa.  The  transition 
probabilities  can  be  derived  from  the  age-  and 
gender-specific forecast of participation rates from 
CPB  as  described  in  section  3.3.  Participation  in 
SADNAP  is  a  binary  state.  Participants  include 
employees,  the  self-employed  and  the 
involuntarily unemployed who are actively seeking 
work.  Non-participants  are  not  available  to  the 
labour  market  and  include  students,  disability 
benefit  recipients,  the  early  retired  and  the 
voluntarily unemployed.  
 
When  PN  denotes  the  probability  of  being  non-
participating  and  PP  the  probability  of 
participating,  the  transition  probabilities  PNP 
(probability  of  a  non-participant  participating  the 
next  year)  and  PPN  (probability  of  a  participant 
not participating the next year) can be defined as 
follows: 
 
(9)        ,D,￿￿age,gender￿ ￿ &1 $
567￿89:,9:;<:=￿
567>?￿89:￿￿,9:;<:=￿+ ￿  @￿age,gender￿  
if  ,-￿￿age,gender￿ < ,-￿￿￿￿age $ 1,gender￿ 
(10)  ,D,￿￿age,gender￿ ￿ @￿age,gender￿  
if  ,-￿￿age,gender￿ >= ,-￿￿￿￿age $ 1,gender￿ 
(11)  ,,D￿￿age,gender￿ ￿ &1 $
5A7￿89:,9:;<:=￿
5A7>?￿89:￿￿,9:;<:=￿+ ￿  @￿age,gender￿ 
if  ,.￿￿age,gender￿ < ,.￿￿￿￿age $ 1,gender￿ 
(12)  ,,D￿￿age,gender￿ ￿ @￿age,gender￿  
if  ,.￿￿age,gender￿ >= ,.￿￿￿￿age $ 1,gender￿ 
Again, if the correction terms ε(age, gender) are 
set  to  zero,  most  individuals  will  have  only  one 
uninterrupted  period  of  participation  during  their 
lifetime.  The higher the correction terms are set, 
the more short periods of participation and non-
participation will occur during a life-course. In the 
baseline scenario, the terms are set to zero. The 
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turn 60. From that age on, the retirement decision 
(for those who are still participating at age 60) is 
modelled  through  the  behavioural  option  value 
model as described in section 4. 
Appendix B - Data sources 
B.1 State pension data 
From  the  state  pension  perspective  the  Dutch 
population  can  be  separated  into  three  groups; 
people  aged  younger  than  15,  people  aged 
between  15  and  64,  and  people  older  than  65. 
People  younger  than  15  are  not  yet  building  up 
state  pension  rights.  People  between  15  and  64 
are  building  up  those  rights  when  living  in  the 
Netherlands,  and  people  aged  65  plus  are 
receiving  a  state  pension  if  they  have  built  up 
entitlements in the past. For the latter two groups 
micro data files are available. 
 
Two  institutions  provide  the  micro  data  sources. 
Statistics Netherlands (CBS) supplies a micro data 
file concerning state pension entitlements. This file 
contains  all  of  the  over  11  million  persons  aged 
15-64  who  live  in  the  Netherlands.  Variables  in 
this  dataset  include  birth  date,  nation  of  origin, 
gender,  household  status,  and  the  number  of 
entitled  years  for  the  AOW.  Micro  datasets  are 
available for 2004 and 2005.  
 
The Social Insurance Bank (SVB) is the authority 
that accomplishes the payment of, among others, 
state pensions. The Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment receives detailed data from the SVB 
on  the  current  state  pensions,  including  a  full 
administrative data file with information on all 2.6 
million persons that were receiving AOW in 2006. 
The SVB data file contains information on gender, 
birth  date,  country  of  residence,  marital  status, 
birth date of the partner, number of entitled years 
for  the  AOW  and  entitlement  to  a  partner 
allowance. Moreover, this file contains information 
on people receiving AOW abroad whereas the CBS 
only  delivers  AOW  information  on  inhabitants  of 
the Netherlands. Some characteristics of the two 
main data sources can be found in table 6.
Table 6  Some characteristics of the two main data sources on state pensions 
  SVB file 2006 (65+)  CBS entitlement file 2005 (15-64) 
  Number  %  Number  % 
Gender         
-  Male  1,130,506  43.5  5,563,649  50.5 
-  Female  1,469,568  56.5  5,458,248  49.5 
Origin         
-  Native
6      9,656,948  87.6 
-  Immigrant (1
st gen)      1,364,949  12.4 
Household status         
-  Single      2,667,713  24.2 
-  Cohabiting      8,337,017  75.8 
State pension entitlement         
-  Complete  2,200,342  84.6  9,443,153  85.7 
-  Reduced  399,802  15.4  1,572,768  14.3 
Country of residence         
-  Netherlands  2,364,891  91.0     
-  Abroad  235,183  9.0     
Total  2,600,074  100.0  11,021,897  100.0 
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Because  of  their  higher  life  expectancy,  women 
outnumber  men  by  56,5%  to  43,5%  among  the 
population  aged  65  and  over.  Among  the 
population  of  15-64  year  olds,  however,  men 
outnumber women by 50.5% to 49.5%. Over 12% 
of the population aged 15-64 are first-generation 
immigrants (not born in the Netherlands). Among 
this  group,  reduced  AOW  rights  are  common 
because the majority of the group migrated to the 
Netherlands  after the  age  of  15.  Almost  15%  of 
the population aged 15-64 already has a reduced 
right.  This  is  about  the  same  as  the  share  of 
reduced  rights  among  the  current  population  of 
pensioners,  but  this  percentage  will  rise  in  the 
future because before reaching the age of 65, part 
of the population aged 15-64 who at the moment 
have a complete entitlement can lose some years 
of accrued rights when they go abroad. 
B.2 Company pension data 
Recently,  Statistics  Netherlands  has  also  started 
providing  micro  data  on  (second-pillar)  company 
pensions.  In  2009,  a  micro  dataset  became 
available  based  on  data  of  a  representative 
sample  of  pension  funds  including  the  large 
pension  funds  for  civil  servants  and  health 
workers.  This  file  includes  individual  data  on 
company  pension  entitlements  of  53%  of  the 
population  aged  15-64  and  67%  of  the  Dutch 
employees.  Some  characteristics  of  the  data 
source  on  private  pension  entitlements  can  be 
found in table 7. 
Table 7  Some characteristics of the main data source on company pensions 
 
As  can  be  seen  from  comparing  the  figures  for 
state  pensions  and  private  pensions,  the 
distribution  of  the  main  characteristics  differs 
somewhat between the full set of people aged 15 
to  64  and  the  subset  of  those  whose  private 
pension  entitlements  are  also  surveyed.  This  is 
caused  by  some  people  having  no  second-pillar 
pension  entitlements  at  all,  like  students,  self-
employed, people on social assistance and people 
who have never worked or who work in low-wage 
jobs without building up entitlements. 
 
Besides  the  common  characteristics  like  gender, 
birth  date,  ethnicity  and  household  status,  the 
data  set  contains  a  projection  of  the  expected 
private  pension  if  a  person’s  career  is  continued 
with the same wage as in 2005. This means that 
the  older  a  person  is,  the  more  accurate  the 
forecast  will  be,  especially  since  most  pension 
funds  in  the  Netherlands  changed  to  a  career-
average pension instead of a final-salary pension 
around  2004.  The  average  wages,  expected 
pensions and median replacement rates (expected 
state  pension  +  expected  private  pension/wage) 
by  subgroup  are  presented  in  table  8.  They 
concern  the  almost  4,2  million  employees  and 
exclude  the  self-employed,  who  usually  build  up 
their own pension savings in the third pillar. 
  State pension entitlements  Private pension entitlements 
  Number  %  Number  % 
Gender         
-  Male  5,563,649  50.5  3,151,280  54.2 
-  Female  5,458,248  49.5  2,664,918  45.8 
Origin         
-  Native  9,656,948  87.6  5,288,526  90.9 
-  Immigrant (1
st gen)  1,364,949  12.4  527,672  9.1 
Household status         
-  Single  2,667,713  24.2  1,325,328  22.8 
-  Cohabiting  8,337,017  75.8  4,484,873  77.2 
State pension entitlement         
-  Complete  9,443,153  85.7  5,074,905  87.3 
-  Reduced  1,572,768  14.3  739,206  12.7 
Participation status         
-  Study  1,207,782  11.0  128,824  2.2 
-  Work  6,916,620  62.9  4,474,776  76.9 
-  Benefit  1,320,852  12.0  644,887  11.1 
-  None  1,217,069  11.1  318,848  5.5 
-  (Early) retired  342,141  3.1  246,483  4.2 
Total  11,021,897  100.0  5,816,198  100.0 VAN SONSBEEK      Micro simulations on the effects of ageing-related policy measures: The Social Affairs Department of 
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Table 8  Expected private pension by main subgroups 
  Wage 
(mean) 





Age-category       
-  15-19  € 12,546  € 3,740  1.283 
-  20-24  € 20,605  € 7,005  0.857 
-  25-29  € 25,580  € 9,128  0.779 
-  30-34  € 28,623  € 10,445  0.754 
-  35-39  € 30,294  € 11,323  0.747 
-  40-44  € 31,855  € 12,194  0.729 
-  45-49  € 33,582  € 13,020  0.702 
-  50-54  € 34,911  € 13,668  0.675 
-  55-59  € 36,016  € 12,460  0.638 
-  60-64  € 36,594  € 10,335  0.575 
Gender       
-  Male  € 37,892  € 13,965  0.644 
-  Female  € 21,984  € 8,275  0.839 
Origin       
-  Native  € 31,008  € 11,714  0.743 
-  Immigrant  € 27,282  € 7,791  0.607 
Household status       
-  Single  € 28,989  € 9,952  0.761 
-  Cohabiting  € 31,147  € 11,767  0.725 
State pension entitlement       
-  Complete  € 30,536  € 11,628  0.751 
-  Reduced  € 32,062  € 9,484  0.576 
All  € 30,703  € 11,394  0.732 
 
When  interpreting  the  data,  we  see  familiar 
patterns  like  wages  and  pension  entitlements 
rising with age and men, natives and cohabitants 
having  considerably  higher  wages  and  pensions 
than  women,  immigrants  and  single  persons 
respectively.  On  average,  employees  have 
expected  second-pillar  pension  savings  of  € 
11,394  which  is  more  than  the  expected  state 
pension  savings
7.  The  data  confirm  the  growing 
importance  of  company  pensions  as  an  income 
component of the elderly.  
 
The  expected  private  pension  peaks  in  the  age 
category 50-54. Past that age, decreases are most 
probably due to people with high pension savings 
tending to retire earlier, although it is also known 
that  the  younger  cohorts  tend  to  have  higher 
second-pillar pension savings (SZW, 2006). Also, 
there  is  a  correlation  between  first  and  second 
pillar  pensions.  People  with  high  company 
pensions  more  often  have  a  complete  state 
pension,  whereas  people  with  incomplete  state 
pension entitlements more often have smaller or 
no company pensions. Rather surprising though, is 
that  people  with  reduced  state  pension 
entitlements  tend  to  have  higher  wages  than 
people with complete entitlements. However, this 
only  holds true  for the  population  of employees, 
                                                 
7   In  2005,  the  maximum  state  pension  for  a 
single person was € 11,211 and for a partner in 
a couple € 8,008. 
which indicates that people who have lived abroad 
for  a  while  tend  to  have  higher  than  average 
wages.  For  the  general  population,  immigrants 
with  reduced  state  pension  entitlements  tend  to 
be on benefits more often.  
 
The median replacement rate
8 is 0.73, but there 
are  sizeable  differences  between  subgroups  with 
women,  natives  and  singles  having  higher 
replacement  rates  than  men,  immigrants  and 
cohabitants  respectively.  The  high  replacement 
rates  of  women  are  due  to  the  large  share  of 
women  in  the  Netherlands  who  during  their  life-
course change to part-time jobs whereas pension 
savings up till then may have been based on full-
time jobs. The higher replacement rates of singles 
are due to the higher first pillar state pension for 
which they qualify. The replacement rates tend to 
decrease  by  age.  This  is  partly  due  to  younger 
cohorts  having  higher  second-pillar  pension 
savings, although it should be kept in mind that in 
a  career  average  system,  replacement  rates  will 
go down with age as wages tend to grow with age 
and  replacement  rates  are  related  to  the  final 
                                                 
8   The average replacement rates are higher than 
the median replacement rates, but they are not 
a  good  indicator  as  some  people  with  high 
pension  savings  and  very  low  wages  (for 
example, because they worked for only part of 
the  year)  can  have  very  high  replacement 
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wage.  Also  the  very  high  replacement  rates 
among the youngest age groups need explanation. 
In the Netherlands a full minimum wage can only 
be  earned  at  23  years  of  age.  Wages  paid  to 
workers below that age tend to be lower, whereas 
expected  private  pensions  take  account  of  the 
wage  increase  due  to  legal  requirements.  But 
because  major  career  jumps  have  yet  to  take 
place at that age, the expected private pensions 
for the younger cohorts are not reliable indicators 
anyway.  
 
Statistics  Netherlands  is  currently  preparing  a 
micro  dataset  on  (third-pillar)  individual 
arrangements,  based  mainly  on  data  files  from 
insurance companies. This dataset is expected to 
be  available  to  researchers  in  2009.  These  data 
are  especially  important  for  groups  that  cannot 
participate in the company pension schemes, like 
the  self-employed.  Finally,  Statistics  Netherlands 
is preparing a micro dataset on personal wealth, 
the  so-called  fourth  pillar  from  tax  office 
databases.  This  fourth  pillar  is  known  to  play  a 
role  in  the  retirement  decision  (Bloemen,  2008) 
and  can  also  be  particularly  important  when 
intergenerational wealth transfers are researched. 
B.3 Macro data sources 
In  SADNAP,  some  macro  data  sources  are  also 
used.  On  demographic  events,  the  most  recent 
population projection by age, gender and ethnicity 
by  Statistics  Netherlands  (CBS,  2009)  is  used. 
From  this  projection,  which  runs  from  2008  to 
2050,  we  take  the  number  of  births  and  the 
number  of  immigrants  by  age  and  gender  per 
year. Also mortality rates and emigration rates by 
age and gender are deducted from this projection. 
Although  this  official  projection  is  used  in  the 
baseline  scenario,  by  including  the  underlying 
processes  of  emigration,  immigration,  births  and 
deaths,  the  model  allows  for  analyses  of 
alternative  scenarios  in  which  (policy-driven) 
changes,  for  example,  in  immigration  or 
emigration levels can be represented. In SADNAP, 
a  narrow  definition  of  ethnicity  is  used, 
distinguishing  only  between  natives  and 
immigrants (people not born in the Netherlands) 
as distinguishing between second generation non-
natives and natives is not important for the state 
pension entitlements. 
 
Information  on  household  types  is  available  for 
the  most  recent  population  projection.  From  this 
projection,  which  runs  from  2009  to  2050,  the 
cohabiting rates by age and gender are derived. 
The CBS data distinguish between single persons, 
couples,  lone  parents,  children  living  with  their 
parents,  people  living  in  institutions  and  a 
remainder  group  of  people  cohabiting  without 
having  a  relationship  to  each  other  (e.g. 
students).  In  SADNAP  only  single  persons  and 
cohabitants are distinguished, based on the social 
benefits  for  which  they  qualify.  The  remainder 
group  –  people  living  together  without  having  a 
relationship – are considered to be single persons. 
Of  the  people  living  in  institutions,  half  are 
considered to be single and half to be cohabiting. 
 
On  labour  participation,  the  most  recent  labour 
participation rates as provided by The Netherlands 
Bureau  of  Economic  Policy  Analysis  (Euwals  and 
Folmer,  2009)  are  used.  These  are  average 
participation  rates  for  five-year  age  classes  by 
gender.  From  these  five-year  averages, 
participation  rates  for  individual  ages  can  be 
deducted.  These  participation  rates  include  all 
persons  who  are  available  to  the labour  market, 
including  the  involuntarily  unemployed  who  are 
actively  seeking  work.  The  non-participants  are 
mainly  students,  disability  benefit  recipients,  the 
early retired and the voluntarily unemployed (e.g. 
housewives). SADNAP currently lacks a model of 
benefit  use  during  the  life  course.  However, 
benefit use plays an important role in determining 
the net effects of ageing-related policy measures, 
like  raising  the  retirement  age.  Therefore,  in 
SADNAP the final state of benefit use at the age of 
64 is modelled. It is assumed that benefit use at 
that high ages is an absorbing state (outflow rates 
are  near  zero).  In  2005,  based  on  the  CBS 
dataset, 27% of the 64 year olds were in receipt 
of  benefits:  17%  from  the  disability  insurance 
scheme,  2%  from  the  unemployment  insurance 
scheme, 4% from social assistance and 4% from 
other benefits. Because of the major reform of the 
DI  scheme,  the  use  of  disability  benefits  will 
decline  in  the  future.  Long-term  disability  rates 
are based on current long-term forecasts based on 
the model described in Van Sonsbeek and Gradus 
(2006).  In  the  meantime,  the  unemployment 
scheme  has  also  undergone  major  reforms, 
limiting  the  duration  of  the  benefit  from  a 
maximum of 7.5 years in 2003 to a maximum of 
just over 3 years in 2006. However, as Euwals, de 
Mooij and van Vuuren (2009) conclude that, as a 
result  of  the  reforms  of  DI  and  early  retirement 
schemes, pressure on UI may increase in the near 
future, it seems plausible to keep long-term rates 
for the other benefits constant at the 2005 level. 
 
Table 9 presents an overview of the macro data 
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Table 9  Overview of macro data sources 





Birth cohorts  n/a  E  E  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Immigrant cohorts  E  E  E  -  -  - 
Mortality rates  E  E  I  I  -  I 
Emigration rates  E  E  E  -  -  - 
Cohabiting rates  E  E  -  n/a  -  - 
Participation rates  E  E  -  -  n/a  - 
Benefit rates  E  E  -  -  E  - 
 
In  table  9,  ‘E’  means  that  a  characteristic  is 
explicitly  known  from  the  data  source  itself,  ‘I’ 
means  that  a  characteristic  is  implicitly  taken 
account  of  in  the  model  and  ‘-‘  means  that  a 
characteristic is not known or used. Finally, some 
combinations, like the age and household status of 
newborns, are not applicable (n/a). 




















%particip. % particip. 
Fem. 55-64
2009 26363 1403 27765 4,85% 2748 15,0% 61,3% 7468 74,7% 36,9%
2010 27087 1444 28532 4,98% 2843 15,5% 61,9% 7461 74,9% 37,9%
2011 28024 1535 29559 5,16% 2965 15,9% 62,9% 7436 75,2% 40,5%
2012 29011 1640 30651 5,35% 3074 16,4% 63,6% 7419 75,4% 42,5%
2013 29905 1686 31591 5,51% 3171 16,9% 64,1% 7403 75,6% 43,4%
2014 30750 1669 32419 5,66% 3263 17,3% 64,3% 7400 75,8% 44,8%
2015 31528 1671 33199 5,79% 3340 17,7% 64,3% 7377 75,7% 45,2%
2016 32237 1624 33860 5,91% 3422 18,2% 64,8% 7363 75,8% 46,0%
2017 32968 1610 34578 6,04% 3503 18,5% 64,9% 7365 76,0% 47,9%
2018 33753 1637 35390 6,18% 3588 18,8% 65,0% 7364 76,1% 48,5%
2019 34552 1591 36144 6,31% 3669 19,1% 64,8% 7355 76,1% 49,5%
2020 35352 1567 36919 6,44% 3749 19,3% 64,7% 7353 76,2% 51,4%
2021 36146 1584 37730 6,59% 3831 19,7% 64,7% 7298 75,8% 50,9%
2022 36943 1583 38526 6,72% 3912 20,0% 64,5% 7235 75,4% 49,6%
2023 37815 1586 39401 6,88% 4009 20,3% 64,5% 7199 75,3% 48,6%
2024 38687 1627 40314 7,04% 4090 20,6% 64,3% 7166 75,2% 48,5%
2025 39514 1663 41177 7,19% 4173 20,9% 64,0% 7121 75,1% 47,8%
2026 40380 1643 42023 7,34% 4257 21,2% 63,6% 7087 75,1% 47,8%
2027 41254 1642 42896 7,49% 4342 21,5% 63,3% 7050 75,1% 48,4%
2028 42130 1665 43795 7,64% 4430 21,8% 63,1% 7028 75,3% 48,7%
2029 43013 1690 44703 7,80% 4515 22,2% 62,9% 6988 75,3% 48,2%
2030 43837 1676 45513 7,94% 4597 22,5% 62,8% 6948 75,3% 48,3%
2031 44549 1629 46178 8,06% 4662 22,9% 62,6% 6940 75,6% 49,2%
2032 45240 1655 46895 8,19% 4736 23,2% 62,3% 6908 75,7% 49,7%
2033 45963 1684 47647 8,32% 4808 23,6% 62,1% 6895 75,9% 49,6%
2034 46694 1659 48354 8,44% 4884 24,1% 61,8% 6865 76,0% 50,4%
2035 47363 1630 48993 8,55% 4945 24,7% 61,6% 6862 76,3% 50,6%
2036 47931 1617 49548 8,65% 4995 25,2% 61,1% 6850 76,4% 50,8%
2037 48342 1591 49933 8,72% 5023 25,7% 60,6% 6864 76,7% 51,3%
2038 48599 1542 50141 8,75% 5048 26,2% 60,3% 6873 76,8% 51,6%
2039 48794 1478 50272 8,77% 5060 26,9% 59,6% 6866 76,6% 51,2%
2040 48869 1409 50277 8,78% 5063 27,5% 59,2% 6887 76,7% 51,6%
2041 48858 1353 50210 8,76% 5066 28,2% 58,8% 6899 76,7% 50,3%
2042 48834 1276 50110 8,75% 5065 29,0% 58,2% 6937 76,8% 50,6%
2043 48768 1210 49977 8,72% 5065 29,8% 57,6% 6967 77,0% 50,8%
2044 48666 1176 49842 8,70% 5063 30,7% 57,1% 6980 76,9% 49,6%
2045 48596 1160 49756 8,68% 5068 31,4% 56,7% 7010 77,1% 50,3%
2046 48460 1148 49608 8,66% 5060 32,2% 56,2% 7035 77,1% 51,1%
2047 48216 1095 49311 8,61% 5049 33,1% 55,6% 7073 77,2% 51,7%
2048 47911 1054 48966 8,55% 5035 34,0% 55,4% 7111 77,4% 52,1%
2049 47604 1045 48649 8,49% 5031 34,9% 54,9% 7128 77,3% 53,0%
2050 47272 1064 48337 8,44% 5022 35,9% 54,8% 7129 77,1% 52,8%
Pension cost (x € 1 mln.) Pensioners population (x 1,000) Working population (x 1,000)